Values Analysis - Spring, 1996 - Drs. Ess, Good
Fallacies discussed thus far:
Slippery slope ("camel's nose in the tent"):
IF we allow "X"then Y will occur.
But if Y occurs, then Z will occur.
But if Z occurs....SOMETHING AWFUL/HIDEOUS/DISGUSTING
will result.
We obviously don't want SOMETHING AWFUL/HIDEOUS/DISGUSTING.
/\We cannot allow "X"
Problem: the logical "links" between X and Y, Y and Z, etc. are not always certainly true. But if these links are merely probable, the argument breaks down.
Mary Anne Warren (implicitly) suggests that the anti-abortion argument —
If we legalize abortion, especially late in the pregnancy, we will erode the level of respect for human life.If we erode the level of respect for human life, then there will be an increase in crime, calls for euthanasia, etc.
Eventually, human life will have no value.
But human life must have value.
/\We cannot legalize abortion [as the first step towards the total loss of value].
is a slippery slope argument — in part, as she suggests that this slope can be better avoided by educating people regarding important moral distinctions (209).
Affirming the Consequent
If A is true, then B is true.B is true.
/\ A is true
Example: If John is a Marxist, he believes in a right to free public education.
Fred believes in the right to free public education.
/\ Fred is a Marxist.
Ad Hominem: an attack on the arguer rather than the argument
Example: "A" argues that because of increased teen pregnancies and ever greater dangers represented by STD's (sexually transmitted diseases) and AIDS - we should develop sex education programs that include condom distribution.
"B" replies by attacking "A," rather than the argument: "`A' is another godless liberal who seeks to destroy traditional morality by encouraging sexual promiscuity."
[Note that this reply also commits fallacy of affirming the consequent:
If someone is a godless liberal intent on destroying traditional morality by encouraging sexual promiscuity - then s/he might favor distributing condoms {if condom distribution can be shown to contribute to sexual promiscuity}."A" favors distributing condoms.
/\ A is a godless liberal... ]
Circularity/Begging the Question
An argument depends on providing independent evidence, reasons, and/or other grounds that apparently support/lead to the truth of a conclusion.
An argument becomes circular when it no longer offers independent evidence, reasons, and/or other grounds to support/lead to the truth of a conclusion:
Because the sky is blue... /\ the sky is blue
Consider the following example:
in attempting to wake my daughter, I tell her: "It's time to get up.""Why?" she asks. I can reply, "Because it's time to get up."
Schematically:
Because it's time to get up... /\ it's time to get up
As stated, the argument begs the question of "why should I get up" as it simply repeats the conclusion - now stated as a premise, "because it's time to get up."
Stated differently, the premise and conclusion are not distinct; the premise "it's time to get up" is not different from or independent of the conclusion "it's time to get up."
[To turn the argument into a non-circular argument, one would have to add what may be implicit - i.e., understood, implied, but not explicitly stated - premises:
Implicit premise: Because it takes you about an hour to get ready for schoolImplicit premise: Because you need to leave for school at 7:15 a.m.
Implicit premise: Because it is now 6:15 a.m.
Conclusion: It's time to get up.]
Mary Anne Warren points out that the basic antiabortion argument —
P1: It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.P2: Fetuses are innocent human beings.
/\ It is wrong to kill fetuses
involves circularity or question-begging: the premises (at least, as understood in one sense) do not provide additional information, independent grounds, etc. beyond what is claimed in the conclusion.
To see this more clearly, however, we need to examine an additional fallacy...
Equivocation: the fallacy of equivocation occurs when we use the same phrase, word, etc. in different meanings or senses in an argument. This results in a "slide in meaning" which appears to support the conclusion: but because of the equivocation or differences in meaning, the premises are in fact irrelevant to the conclusion.
My favorite example:
P1: Hot dogs are better than nothing.P2: Nothing is better than steak.
/\ Hot dogs are better than steak.
This arguments works if "nothing" in P1 means precisely the same as "nothing" in P2. But this is not the case. "Nothing" in P1 means something like "nothing to eat at all," while "nothing" in P2 means something like "no food among all the possible foods one can eat."
Because the term "nothing" is used in two different senses in the two different premises, the premises really do not lead to the conclusion.
Similarly, Mary Anne Warren argues that "human being" in the antiabortion argument above is an equivocal term. It can mean either
a) "a full-fledged member of the moral community," (the "moral sense") orb) any member of the species Homo Sapiens (the "genetic sense").
If we accept this distinction, then the argument is first of all guilty of the fallacy of equivocation:
P1: It is wrong to kill innocent human beings (in the moral sense).P2: Fetuses are innocent human beings (in the genetic sense).
/\ It is wrong to kill fetuses
Clearly, if "innocent human beings" is used in two different senses, then P1 and P2 are simply not talking about the same thing — innocent human beings in the moral sense.
But if they are not talking about the same thing, then the conclusion doesn't follow (206).
Warren also argues here that if the conclusion is to follow from the premises, then we must use "innocent human beings" in P2 not simply in the genetic sense, but also in the moral sense — i.e.,
P2: Fetuses are innocent human beings in the moral sense.
But to understand the phrase "innocent human beings" in this way is to beg the question — to assume what we're trying to prove (that killing fetuses is wrong).
To say it another way, to understand the phrase in this way, coupled with the assumption (P1) that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings in the moral sense, adds nothing independent of the conclusion. Rather, the claim of the conclusion is already contained in (and thus assumed by) the premises: this makes the argument circular or question-begging.
[This means that Warren puts the defender of the argument in a dilemma: either: we use the term "innocent human being" in two distinct senses (the moral and the genetic) — in which case, the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion,
or: we use the term "innocent human being" in the same sense — in which case the argument is circular and question-begging.]
Additional fallacies to be considered:
inconsistency popularity/tradition
denying the antecedent two wrongs make a right
hasty conclusion provincialism
evading the issue invincible ignorance
(cf. Weston, pp. 83-88)
Analogy argument: works by comparing two cases - the familiar and the novel:
by stressing the relevant similarities between the two cases,the argument then takes a last characteristic from the familiar case to suggest the conclusion of the argument.
Example:
|
Familiar Case |
Novel Case |
| A person is possessed of basic human rights - including the right to life. | A fetus is like a person |
| Destroying the life of a person violates his/her rights, and | Aborting the fetus is like destroying the life of a person |
| /\therefore is morally wrong. | /\ aborting the fetus violates his/her rights and is therefore wrong |
Assessment: since analogical arguments turn on relevant similarities - to strengthen an analogical argument requires the development of additional similarities. (Make sure we're comparing apples to apples.) Even so, the analogical conclusion remains merely probable.
Contrariwise, an analogical argument can be demonstrated to be weak as one points to more and more relevant differences (i.e., so as to demonstrate that the familiar case and the novel case are "apples and oranges" - not sufficiently similar for the proposed conclusion to be strongly supported).
[Baruch Brody's critique of abortion rights includes a critique of the analogy:
|
Familiar Case |
Novel Case |
| A person's right to life includes the right to self-defense. | A mother's right to life includes the right to self-defense. |
| If one is attacked by another seeking to destroy one's life, |
In the case of the fetus representing a threat to the mother's life,
to abort the fetus — depriving it of its life — is like defending oneself against an attacker. |
| /\ one may legitimately deprive one's attacker of his/her life in self-defense | /\ One may legitimately abort the fetus. |
Brody points out, following Pope Pius XI, what he takes to be relevant differences between the two cases: unlike the attacker in the familiar case — the fetus is innocent, i.e., it does not consciously and intentionally seek to destroy its mother's life in the way an adult with a weapon may consciously and intentionally seek to kill another adult (199).]
Modus Ponens Modus Tollens