Conception of human nature as rational freedom / autonomy / capacity for self-rule: in–class example of when we feel free, unfree.
A) =>the content of Kantian morality: humanity as an end in itself (2nd formulation of the categorical imperative):
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case an an end in itself, never as means only. (62)
derives from his starting point — that human beings are rational freedoms, fundamentally autonomies,
capable of self–rule, i.e., of establishing one's own goals/ends, and appropriate means thereto.
("Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law unto itself..." whose principle of action is the categorical imperative. [63])
[On the reality of such freedom: This capacity for freedom is assumed/demonstrated (in a carefully qualified sense - see p. 64) by our ability to use the (first formulation of the) categorical imperative.
Kant offers additional arguments for this conception of human freedom, ultimately, as a "legislative" or law-giving facility— see p. 63 and "III" below.
Still more fundamental arguments for the reality of human freedom are developed in Kant's
epistemology : human beings are not passive receptors of sense–data only, but also active "creators" of their phenomenal/experiential world:=> metaphysics, including the fundamental distinction between phenomenal experience [as fully determined according to causal/scientific law] and noumenal realities — including human freedom as a possibility in the first Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason.]
This capacity for self–rule is first of all the basis of
an intrinsic, absolute human dignity (in contrast with extrinsic, instrumental value), and thereby of absolute respect — beginning with self (as a subjective principle)then, reciprocally, of other rationalities, as an objective principle (62).
This leads finally to Kant's notion of "the kingdom of ends" — his version of an ideal democratic society (drawn in part precisely from Lockean and Rousseauian concepts of human freedom as positive freedom — and thereby as the foundation of democratic society.)
B) => first formulation of the categorical imperative as issuing in the form of universality itself
(where such universality is, in turn, a universally–shared characteristic of the moral "ought" — no matter which individual/sub–culture/culture expresses the "ought" with regard to a given content, e.g.,
You ought not to lie to your friendsYou ought to preserve the lives of the elderly, no matter the costs.
You ought / ought not to be a slaveholder.
You ought / ought not to circumcise baby girls.
If we express such "oughts," Kant argues — then we assume/presume the sort of universal validity of our moral claims established procedurally by the categorical imperative.
Notice that this is how Kant resolves the facts of cultural relativism with the rationalist/pluralist claim that universals may exist, though they may be interpreted/applied/(mis)understood in different ways by different individuals/sub–cultures/cultures.
That is, universality, Kant argues, is a "form" of morality shared by every individual/sub–culture/culture so far as it expresses an "ought" — even though the content of that "ought" may vary widely from culture to culture, etc.
Consider the following example:
| Ethical Relativism | Cultural Relativism | Pluralism / Kant |
| (These different values demonstrate that no universal values exist) | Inuit: unproductive elderly cannot be sustained => in/voluntary euthanasia | (Each of |
|
U.S.: unproductive elderly will be sustained at virtually any cost
=>
no euthanasia |
these is understood as universal, what "everyone ought to do" under these
circumstances
= the form of universalizability as tested by the categorical imperative.) |
|
|
U.K.: unproductive elderly will be sustained at state cost - up to
age 62.
=> no euthanasia, but "letting die" even if as a result of preventable causes (e.g., kidney failure) |
Strength: as circumscribing the form of morality — the categorical imperative appears to capture an important "intuition" about how we use the term "ought," while further allowing for the possibility of cultural relativism.
Critique: critics object that the categorical imperative, as circumscribing the form of morality, is often too ambiguous, even "empty" of application.
(Ess's view: it appears that some case examples - e.g., the ones that Kant provides as well as others - work at least as well as other approaches: consider, for example, the ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding a utilitarian effort to predict consequences, determine what consequences are relevant, etc. But the critics have a point: at least some case examples are not neatly resolved by the categorical imperative.)
[Meta–ethical observation:
Notice that if an ethical relativist attempts to argue:
"You ought not to make moral judgments about others." Or"You ought not to impose your own values on others."
— even the ethical relativist attempts hereby to claim that at least one moral guideline is not valid only relative to the individual/sub–culture/culture —
namely, the guideline that moral values can only be relative to the individual/sub–culture/culture, and hence one ought not judge others and/or impose one's own values on others....
At best, the ethical relativist at this point would seem to argue in a way captured by Kant's categorical imperative:
can we will that the maxim of our action (never judge others/never impose your own moral values on others)become a universal law —
i.e., are we willing to endorse as rational the world that would result if everyone were behave this way?
(Or, in less fancy terms: do we want to say that everyone should / ought to follow the guideline that, because moral values are simply relative, everyone ought not judge others/impose one's own values on others?)
If the ethical relativist says "yes" to this question — then s/he seems to endorse as a moral universal the claim that one ought not judge others/impose one's own values on others.
But the paradox is — this moral imperative of the ethical relativist thereby emerges as a moral universal (one "endorsed" by Kant's categorical imperative) – one which denies the possibility of moral universals.
At best, this seems to suggest that even ethical relativism must endorse at least one moral absolute.
At worst, this suggests that ethical relativism is internally self-contradictory. For a rationalist, especially a Kantian, such self-contradiction is sufficient grounds for rejecting the position.
That is, it fails the test of the categorical imperative:
as the maxim of telling a lie when convenient, on Kant's showing, cannot be universalized without undermining all truth-telling entirely — and thereby, it undermines the possibility of telling a lie in the first place (lies only "work" if people presume truth)— and thereby, the maxim contradicts itself if universalized;so the moral imperative not to judge others, issuing from ethical relativism, cannot be universalized without contradicting the fundamental claim of ethical relativism itself [i.e., that there are no moral universals].]
Comment: in light of Kant's conception of human freedom as an autonomous, legislative capacity, one which serves as the foundation of both his rationalist/pluralist morality and a political conception of "the kingdom of ends,"
compare at this point the political consequences of adopting either a
Hobbsian materialism/ethical egoism/ethical relativism, OR(Lockean/Rousseauian) Kantian rationalism / ethical pluralism
how "what we say" about morality => more fundamental philosophical claims
This is the approach followed by Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals, as he begins with an (Aristotelian) argument suggesting that the only thing good in itself (i.e.,in an intrinsic way, as a final good) is the good will.
This argument works by way of a thought experiment, in which we separate out possible motives for a putatively "good" act -
good will/intention/dutyself-interest
inclination
The argument is that if we can separate motives this way
(only possible in the framework of theory and argument — not possible in the "real world" of human decision-making and action)
we seem to share an "intuition" that only the act done from good will/duty is a genuinely moral act.
If this is so — then what are the underlying assumptions of this moral intuition?
Moral worth
=> [duty = acting out of respect for the {universal} law]::
[only possible for a rational being – i.e., one capable of conceiving, acting from {universal} law]
=> First formulation of the Categorical Imperative (universalizability)
=> Second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (rational autonomies as ends)
Definition of human nature
Contrary to prevailing emotivist theories of ethics which (following Hume and philosophical views going back to the early Sophists in Ancient Greece),
Kant stresses rationality as the central defining feature of being human.
Kant's conception of rationality involves:
the Newtonian/Enlightenment conception of the universe or natural order as following laws — i.e., general principles which are universally valid, e.g.,
the law of gravity: the force of attraction between any two bodies is the product of their masses divided by the distance between them squared, multiplied by the graviatational constant.
[Notice what the conception of law involves here: such a law describes the form of relationship among any two physical bodies — no matter their mass, location, motion, etc. — in the universe.]
So Kant says, "Everything in nature works according to laws." (59)
Only reason is capable of uncovering/discerning/understanding such general laws. While such general laws obviously describe the relations between particular physical bodies — bodies and their motion as discerned by the senses — the perception of sense data alone does not inevitably lead to the discovery/invention of these laws. (Hence, it took us awhile — ca. 2400 years — from the time this philosophical/scientific conception of the universe was first developed by the ancient Greek philosopher Thales [7th ct. B.C.E.] to its stunning fulfillment in Newton's systematic ordering of basic physical laws in mathematical terms in the Principia Mathematica of 1687.)
[By contrast: a pure empiricist — one who believes that the only reliable knowledge is of a material or physical order, gained solely through the senses — is ultimately limited to simply cataloging sense descriptions of given particular objects. S/he can never "move" beyond particulars given in sense experience to general or universal claims about what relations may hold between the particular objects of sense experience. Hence, while Hobbes tries to be an empiricist — the moment he invokes reason and general laws or rules allegedly descriptive of human behavior, he goes beyond the empiricist limits he sets for himself.]
Finally, Kant argues that this capacity of reason to discover/invent universally–valid laws in the domain of physics (and the natural sciences generally) is but one side or facet of reason. More completely, reason for Kant includes the capacity to discover/invent universally–valid laws in two domains, namely,
the theoretical — in this domain, reason discovers/invents the universally–valid laws of physics in particular and (physical/material) nature in general;and, analogously,
the practical — in this domain, reason likewise discovers/invents the universally–valid laws of morality — i.e., those laws that are binding on auto–nomous (auto–nomos = "self" + "law" => self-ruling) or free rationalities (including, but not restricted to, human beings).
That is: just as it is reason which is capable of discovering/inventing physical laws — still more generally, the form of lawfulness as such (i.e., a general rule which is universally valid, necessary, etc.), ...
so, Kant argues, reason is that part of us which is capable of discovering/inventing moral laws — still more generally, laws which
have the "form" or characteristic of lawfulness as such — i.e., they are universally valid, necessary, etc.
This "form of lawfulness as such" is not only a form or characteristic which only reason may discern or create: moreover,
a) it is this form of lawfulness that the good will respects — and thus is the source of duty:Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. (58)
– in contrast with other possible motives, including inclination, self–interest, etc.
b) this form is the characteristic of a moral action and its maxim which the categorical imperative seeks to establish or test. That is,
If I can will that the maxim of my action become universal law — i.e., result in a world defined by such laws as created and followed by rational freedoms, one which, like physical nature constitutes a consistent and harmonious whole — then my act and maxim are universalizable: that is, they achieve the form of lawfulness as such.
C) this form of lawfulness per se allows Kant to reconcile cultural relativism with an ethical pluralism/rationalism — avoiding ethical relativism.
[Much of this is "behind" his statement:
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason....(59)]