Overview: in our discussion of abortion, we have taken the following path ---
Roe v. Wade - considering both the arguments of the majority justices (authored by Blackmun) and the minority dissent (White):
Here, the arguments for abortion rights turned on (a) a right to privacy between the woman as patient and her physician, as this right seems to follow in part from (b) the lack of consensus - medical/theological/ philosophical - regarding the question "when does life begin"?
Judith Jarvis Thomson:
Thomson argues for abortion rights - but does so by first accepting the anti-abortion claim that life (in the sense of a human life possessing rights and deserving specifically protection of the right to life) begins at conception. She does so by developing a series of analogy arguments - arguments that are both seemingly required (as we move from law and moral guidelines which hold for familiar cases to the effort to develop law and moral guidelines for the relatively novel case of abortion).
An important element in Thomson's argument is here the distinction between what can be morally required of everyone ("minimally decent Samaritanism") and what is morally praiseworthy, but not required of anyone (the Good and Splendid Samaritans).
Baruch Brody:
Brody argues against abortion - first, by attacking some of Thomson's analogies, and second, by attempting as carefully as possible to establish a biological definition of human life as a basis for then determining when the fetus may be thought to hold a right to life.
Brody uses the criterion of brain activity (drawn - analogically - from the mirror issues in questions of euthanasia - i.e., when does life end) to define human life. On this definition, life begins by ca. the fifth week of conception.
There are two difficulties with Brody's position.
1) His position will not satisfy the more conservative positions, which argue that life begins at conception - because at conception, human DNA is present, the material basis for a potential human being who holds an absolute right to life.
But the fact that there is disagreement among these efforts to determine a biological definition of human life points to one of the central arguments of Roe v. Wade - namely, that there is no medical consensus as to "when life begins."
2) His position can be directly undermined - as it is by Mary Anne Warren - by noting that rights (as non-material entities - i.e., entities that are not apparent to the senses, in contrast with material entities and characteristics, such as eye color, etc.) are thus distinct from biology (including efforts to determine on the basis of empirically verifiable - i.e., "sensible" - characteristics [such as DNA, heartbeat, brain activity, etc.] which may then serve as "markers" as to when human life and thus human rights "begin."
This critique, if sound, forces us to turn to moral and theological ("metaphysical") efforts to define the human person and human rights.
But again - just as there is no consensus regarding biological definitions of human life (and thus human rights), so there is no consensus regarding theological and/or moral definitions of human life (and thus human rights).
In short, we appear to be headed back to Roe v. Wade.
Mary Anne Warren:
Warren argues a moral claim - that the fetus is not a "person."
To do this, she first distinguishes between personhood as a moral status, as distinct from biology. On her showing, only persons have rights, including the right to life: both personhood and the rights of persons are independent of the biological status of membership in the human species.
Using her criteria of personhood, a fetus does not appear to qualify as a person. Hence, it does not have a claim to rights, including the right to life.
Warren's argument includes a sharp critique of the logic of the standard anti-abortion argument: on her showing, this argument either begs the question (and thus is invalid) or commits the fallacy of equivocation (and thus is invalid).
Warren's argument, however, points to what is now a familiar problem: it is by no means clear that there is consensus on such moral definitions of personhood.
Given the lack of consensus on biological, moral, and theological definitions of personhood (and thus the right to life)...
We have further pursued this discussion by way of examining diverse religious perspectives on abortion, a recent debate between philosophers and theologians on abortion, and two student presentations.
Among other things, we should now be clear that
a) in addition to the debate between religious conservatives ("pro-life"/"respect life") and more secular arguments (Roe v. Wade, Thomson, Warren, etc.) - there is a further debate between diverse religious traditions and within given religious positions (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church has apparently changed its position on abortion over the centuries), and
b) there is a spectrum of agreements and disagreements between diverse positions - so that, despite fundamental and irresoluble differences between Catholics and (many) Protestants regarding the question, "when life begins," they can agree on a number of important points, including the desirability of reducing/eliminating the need for abortion, the importance of education in the project, the importance of continued dialogue, etc.
These theoretical considerations and debate outcomes lead to additional metatheoretical issues:
1) What does the lack of consensus mean?
A) Does it mean what ethical relativists think it means - i.e., that
the lack of consensus on these fundamental definitions suggests there are no universally valid values with regard to this (or any other) moral issue.
[The logic of this argument, however, is open to critique. And part of the critique points to an alternative explanation for the lack of consensus - i.e., the position of pluralism / critical rationalism:
Universally valid values may exist - but we may
(a) know these only imperfectly, and/or
(b) interpret/apply/understand these values in different ways, e.g., as influenced /conditioned by diverse cultural / economic / other circumstances.]
Or does the lack of consensus mean what the ethical dogmatist/absolutist would take it to mean - i.e.,
Universally valid values exist - and
(a) we (the members of the morally correct position) know what these values are, so that
(b) those who claim different moral values can only be wrong.
B) Even if the ethical relativist is right about the specific values and claims surrounding the abortion question - does this mean that no universally valid response or claim may be established, e.g., in terms of legislation regarding abortion?
Perhaps the lack of consensus would justify ....(following Roe v. Wade) ? Perhaps the lack of consensus is not fatal to the quest for important agreements and commonly-shared project, as fostered by rational dialogue between persons of diverse religious commitments?
2) ______________________________
Writing Assignment
1) Summarize either your own position or the position of one of the theorists we've examined regarding abortion. (If you refer to one of the theorists, be sure to document properly!)
2) Support this position as best you can, using at least one argument we have examined either in the text and/or in the Web materials.
Be sure to explain this argument carefully, identifying clearly the premises and the conclusion(s) of the argument. You will also need to document the source of this argument/these arguments in our text and/or the Web materials.
3) Critique this position as best you can, drawing on the various logical and theoretical critiques and alternative arguments we have examined. Again, be sure to explain this critique carefully.
Insofar as the critique involves an alternative argument, identify clearly the premises and the conclusion(s) of the alternative argument/s. Again, you will also need to document the source of this argument in our text and/or Web materials.
4) In what is likely to require several paragraphs, summarize our discussion of what the lack of consensus regarding the abortion question can mean.
Of the various possible metatheoretical approaches (e.g., ethical relativism, pluralism/ critical rationalism, dogmatism/absolutism) - which of these approaches seems most plausible to you?
Don't simply identify the metatheoretical approach: argue for it briefly.