Comments:
 

1) the problem of "conscience": given the role of social conditioning in presenting and reinforcing the basic beliefs (worldview) of the culture(s) in which we are formed - how do we know whether or not our "intuitive" moral concepts are indeed
 
the voice of conscience -

not the voice of cultural conditioning (including specific cultural norms and prejudices)?

--> Methodological considerations:
 

a) an initial test of an ethical theory is how well its conclusions regarding a specific case "square" or "fit" our own, already operating ethical norms and intuitions.

[this parallels {indeed, precedes!} the methodological approach in the sciences, which tests a hypothesis/theory first of all with regard to how well it fits an already established body of theory and knowledge.]

If the conclusions and decisions reached by a given ethical theory directly contradict our initial ethical norms and intuitions - this will be grounds for critically assessing the given ethical theory as possibly flawed.

[parallel: if a new theory/experiment directly contradicts an established body of theory/knowledge - the burden of proof falls on the new theory/experiment.]

Problem: what if our already established ethical norms and intuitions are solely the result of social conditioning?

[parallel: what if the already established body of theory/knowledge is fundamentally flawed: the new hypothesis/experiment may be precisely the "key experiment" which uncovers the phenomena which reveal the flaws and/or limitations of the already established body of theory/knowledge.
 

To reject the new hypothesis/experiment because it fails to fit the established body of theory/knowledge is to run the risk of remaining attached to a flawed/limited body of theory/knowledge.]

--> Second methodological principle:

in the event of contradiction between the conclusions/decisions of a given ethical theory and our extant moral norms and intutions, raise the question: Is it possible the "new" ethical theory is correct - and that my extant moral norms and intuitions are mistaken in this instance?
 
[So the quote from J.J.C. Smart regarding the "counterintuitive" consequences of utilitarianism in the domain of animal rights, p. 287.]

2) Equality is ambiguous:
 

a) "equality" may mean "sameness" - treat every entity alike, regardless of diffferences, and/or

b) "equality" may mean equal concern for different interests, contexts, etcs.

[At least some moral debates turn on different positions using different conceptions of equality -

e.g., affirmative action policies assume "equality" in sense "b" - and critics of affirmative action often assume "equality" in sense "a".

--> Question: what should "equality" mean in a moral context?

More importantly: on what grounds/reasons/evidence/argument can you justify your definition of equality?
 

Question: in light of what you now know about the Cowart case, explain briefly how
 

a) a utilitarian (of Mill's sort) and

b) you

would respond to Dax's original request to be allowed to die.

If your position has changed from your original answer - what evidence/argument/grounds/reasons have caused the change?

In-class discussion:

293, #'s 1, 2 (Kevorkian)

Question: how do your positions compare regarding
 

a) Dax Cowart's request to be allowed to die/to end his own life and

b) Kevorkian's justification for physician-assisted suicide?

Question:

Identify the single greatest strength of utilitarianism - and what seems to you to be the strongest/most important critique of utilitarianism.

If you include utilitarianism in your ethical worldview - how do you compensate for the limitations and weaknesses of utilitarianism? That is - how do you answer these critiques?

Reading: Boss, ch. 9, 299-318

Homework:

a) Be prepared to discuss in class the following exercises:
 

302, #'s 3,4

305, #1

311, #2, 3, 4, 6

319, # 2, 3, 4

b) informal writing - respond to

311, # 2, 3

319, # 2, 3, 4