Diversity of views and beliefs on all topics! -
belief in absolute moral standards grounded in reason // the belief that such beliefs are a myth and impossible to achieve
belief that human beings are naturally good // belief that human beings, if left without universal moral guidelines, will fall into chaos and anarchy
when confronted with others in danger: it's not our business to be involved // we have an obligation to intervene and help others
Definitions of "freedom"
negative freedom: freedom = freedom from control, influence, etc. (in the form of moral systems, parental and societal norms, peer pressure, etc.)
positive freedom? (e.g., belief in "free will" which deserves respect from others) freedom = freedom to determine one's own moral codes ("laws"); such freedom as self-rule ("auto-nomos")
--> democratic polity (Locke, Jefferson, King)
Moral theories:
some argue their positions on the basis of:
feelings - sometimes in conjunction with, sometimes opposed to reason - e.g., feeling good about tricking an unpleasant boss
consequences (e.g., the consequences of JoAnne's telling/not telling she's HIV positive) - a variant of which is
appeal to force (the force of the many, the force of the individual who will beat the crap out of the drug dealer, etc.)
universal duties/obligations/rights (grounded in reason, religion, "nature" - and/or some combination of the three) - e.g., Doug's "right to know"; a duty to keep someone from harm if you can; responsibility to children (both one's own and others)
In this is raised the question of the relationship between power
and moral right. Question (which will be important both
for issues in cultural relativism and religion):
does might make right?
and/or
doe right make (for legitimate use of) might?
At least one person sees the contradiction in the ethical subjectivist
position:
There are no universal moral truths; morality is relative
But this statement is taken as a universal truth about morality by the subjectivist/relativist.
At least one person sees the implicit fallacy (of affirming the
consequent):
If there exists a set of universal rights
[objective] --> I sincerely believe these rights to be universal
[subjective]
What I sincerely believe to be universal rights
[subjective] --> are universal rights.
[objective]
"Feelings can often be world views that just haven't been
thought out well." (M.T.)
Darwin // --> Social Darwinism: the belief that evolution is "value-laden" - i.e., = "Progress," the move from the less valuable/desirable state to the more valuable/desirable state --> 19th ct. Victorian England is morally superior to any tribe in the Australian Outback.
--> Ruth Benedict and "cultural relativism" (as more than simply the descriptive methodological guideline/observation, "values vary from culture to culture" --> to become the prescriptive moral claim "because there are no universal values, we cannot judge other cultures' value by our own - and we must acknowledge/tolerate/respect all cultural belief systems")
The intention here is the morally noble one of seeking to "redeem" the integrity/value of "primitive" cultures from the condemnation that falls upon them in light of Social Darwinism.
--> Problems:
a) commits the naturalistic fallacy, of moving from what is to what ought to be the case
b) some of the earlier ethnographic/anthropological/sociological observations upon which the moral claim of cultural (or ethical) relativism is made turn out to be inaccurate
c) do cultural differences necessarily mean "there are no cultural universals" -
or can we interpret cultural differences in part to mean that there may be cultural universals (no killing, no lying, no stealing, no sex outside of prescribed boundaries, duties to family and children [including prohibitions against incest, etc.])?
Notice the problem of affirming the consequent:
If there are no universal values - then we would observe moral disagreement.
We observe moral disagreement.
Therefore, there are no universal values.
Questions:
What is "the moral community," and how do we define
it?
Question about the "hari kari" issue.
Assignment for Thursday, Feb. 12, 1998:
pp. 132f., #'s 1, 4, 6, 8
pp. 138f., #'s 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
pp. 144f., #'s 2, 3