Overview
I. "From Dichotomies to Trichotomies" We begin by examining the limits of a dualist logic - especially as this dualism leads us to several common assumptions, i.e., that we are forced to choose between a claim being entirely true or false, and (correlatively), that our claims are either entirely objective or subjective, that our claims are either absolutely/dogmatically/universally true or entirely relative to the individual and/or his/her culture.
Over against these dilemmas, I try to introduce a third position - one characterized in terms such as "constructivist"/intersubjectivity and rational (or critical) pluralism.
Rational pluralism presumes that the careful use of reason will avoid both dogmatism and (ethical) relativism, by discovering/developing "quasi-universal" or "relatively absolute" values and claims which may be applied/interpreted/understood in a variety of ways in relation to a variety of individual and cultural contexts.
II: Examples of a pluralist rationality? I provide some examples of such claims from the history of Western philosophy - specifically, from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant.
For a contemporary example of rational pluralism, I describe Habermas's theory of communicative reason, the rules of discourse, and the ideal speech situation, as necessary conditions for democratic dialogues and governance.
Finally, I ask the skeptical question: does Habermas's theory work in praxis - and describe the results of a recent debate in which, as Catholic and Protestant participants discussed abortion issues following Habermas's discourse ethics, they arrived in fact at a consensus which included both significant points of agreement while preserving intractable religious differences in a pluralism.
[Consequences for postmodern critiques of Western traditions as dualistic, excessively rationalistic?
Habermas's theory of communicative rationality thus stands as a practical and successful instance of rational pluralism, one with deep roots in the Enlightenment and the figures of Western philosophy described earlier. This overview should make clear the trajectory of Western rationalism towards greater freedom, equality, and tolerance of diverse viewpoints within a framework of rational pluralism which is neither dogmatic nor ethically relativistic.
Given this overview and trajectory, I would argue that the postmodernist who hopes to unleash greater freedom, equality, and tolerance through an ethical relativism aimed at overcoming an alleged dogmatism and intolerance of modern/Enlightenment rationality
(a) does not have an adequate understanding of rationality in the modern period (and, more generally, in Western tradition) and
(b) directly undermines his/her interest in freedom, equality, and tolerance - because ethical relativism
(i) cannot consistently endorse any value set (such as freedom, equality, and tolerance) over other value sets (e.g., slavery, inequality, intolerance) as having any greater validity for anyone besides oneself, and (ii) rather opens the door to the Sophist/tyrant who will impose his/her views upon others by brute force.]
Many people in North American culture tend to think in terms of a particular logic:
Either "A" is true // OR "B" is true -- BUT NOT BOTH
This either/or thinking is technically called dualism - and it shows up in all sorts of places:
Either you're for us or against us.
Abortion is either right or wrong.
Guns don't kill people - people kill people.
Sometimes our either/or's are largely helpful ways of thinking - e.g.,
The light is either on or off
But much of the time, such dichotomies are not accurate - they don't provide us with the whole range of possibilities.
In fact, to propose a dichotomy that that appears to capture all the possibilities - when in fact there are are more than the two possibilities presented - is called false dilemma (or, alternatively, the fallacy of bifurcation).
In addition to the above examples, consider:
Is the law founded on unchanging and absolute principles, or is it like shifting sands, blowing about with the winds of popular opinion? (Cal Thomas)
Either this book (preacher pointing to the Bible) is what it says it is - the inerrant, literal Word of God - or it's a sham, a hoax, and a waste of print and paper which should be burned as worse than useless.
[see <http://www.drury.edu/faculty/ess/logic/informal/Bifurcation.html>
For additional fallacy definitions and examples, see <http://www.drury.edu/faculty/ess/logic/informal/overview.html>
For discussion of the postmodernist claim that the Western tradition is dualist, see Monism, dualism, and pluralism in the history of Western Philosophy and related materials on Relativism, dogmatism, pluralism and "Modernism"/postmodernism]
When faced with dilemmas, then, a first question is to ask, "Does the dilemma in fact cover all the possibilities - or is it missing a third (or still more) possibility?"
A. A first false dilemma:
something is either true or false
Depends: what are our assumptions about "truth"?
It turns out that if we assume that "truth" comes in one flavor, and one flavor only - this is probably right.
That flavor of truth - known as the correspondance theory of truth - however, is not the only possible understanding of truth.
If we expand our conceptual vocabulary to include an instrumentalist/figurative notion of truth - in fact, multiple diverse truths are possible (i.e., pluralism).
Schematically:
[illustrated with the examples of topo and highway maps, and four different views on a single person], issuing in the following distinctions:
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literal/correspondance |
figurative/instrumental |
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Truth consists in a perfectly isometric ("one-to-one") correspondance between a given object (as an "external reality") and its "picture," image, representation, description, etc. |
Truth consists in the ability of a given map to offer at least a partial representation of a given object - on the basis of which we are able to successfully "maneauver" through a world. (For example, predicting that if we drive for 220 miles in a northeasterly direction on a road labeled I-44, we'll arrive in a city called St. Louis.) |
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Logic: such a correspondance truth is either right or wrong (i.e., the picture either corresponds faithfully or it doesn't). Similarly, if more than one "truth" is offered regarding the same object - only one such truth can be right. Different/divergent claims about the same object must therefore be wrong. |
Logic: multiple, but different and partial truths may be true simultaneously. Indeed, a more complete account or picture of a given object is achieved by holding together such multiple maps as each particular map offers detail and information not contained in the others (= complementarity) |
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Absolutist - there is a single right truth, and we know what it is, so that we can reject alternative claims as certainly false. |
"Pluralistic" - not relativistic (some things can still be false.) Nor does this view exclude the possibility of there being some truths which fit the literal/correspondance model. |
B. More false dilemmas:
1) the absolutist/relativist dilemma:
Either: there is a single/universal/unchanging/absolute truth [including a set of moral and political values] that is the only valid truth for all peoples at all times in all places under all circumstances,
OR: there are no universal values - and one's choices turn entirely on individual preferences and/or socially enforced patterns.
This absolutist/relativist dilemma includes a second:
Either: you conform with what we know to be the single/universal/unchanging/absolute truth [including a set of moral and political values] that is the only valid truth for all peoples at all times in all places under all circumstances,
OR: you're wrong!
These two dilemmas are tied into a third:
Either our knowledge claims are objective
OR our knowledge claims are subjective
Schematically:
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objective |
subjective |
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universal; necessary (= "forced" by external reality, other sorts of constraints); absolute (=valid for all [rational] creatures at all times, all places, regardless of culture and context) |
individual; arbitrary (= not "forced" by external reality, other sorts of constraints); individually/culturally relative (= not valid for anyone beyond the self, other members of the same culture.) |
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Scientific/mathematical claims are usually the model here, especially as believed to be empirically verifiable (i.e., confirmed/disconfirmed by the senses and their extension through instruments). Such claims are thus susceptible to proof, verification, and are entirely certain |
Aesthetic judgments, judgments of "taste" are often (perhaps wrongly) thought of as "subjective" in this sense, as in: "There's no accounting for taste," "Chacun son goût " ["To each his own (in matters of ) taste"] |
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Absolutist - there is a single set of standards/criteria with universal validity upon which certain judgments may be founded --> different claims are certainly wrong |
Relativist - "anything goes," because there are no standards or criteria with validity beyond the individual with which we might judge. |
This dichotomy, however, rests on an especially Newtonian, 17th ct., materialist conception (i.e., only the material world is real, known by the senses, via the methodologies of the natural sciences) -- a conception still alive and well in American culture, under the influence of 19th ct. postivism.
In light of later developments (Kant, cognitive psychology, relativity theory, quantum mechanics), however, this dichotomy breaks down into at least a trichotomy:
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objective |
subjective | |
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truth as correspondance between internal pictures and external realities |
truth as the result of the conjunction of "subjective" elements (standpoint, background beliefs, [possibly] universal "cognitive frameworks" which shape our reception of external sense experience) and "objective" elements (external sense objects, etc.) |
truth as entirely constructed from within the individual (= solipsism, extreme skepticism) |
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universal necessary (= "forced" by external reality, other sorts of constraints); absolute (=valid for all [rational] creatures at all times, all places, regardless of culture and context) |
"quasi-universal" some truths may be necessary as they are "forced" not only by external realities but also by internal but (near)-universally-shared cognitive structures (beginning with frameworks of time and space) |
individual arbitrary (= not "forced" by external reality, other sorts of constraints); individually/culturally relative (= not valid for anyone beyond the self, other members of the same culture.) |
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Scientific/mathematical claims are usually the model here, especially as believed to be empirically verifiable (i.e., confirmed/disconfirmed by the senses and their extension through instruments). Such claims are thus susceptible to proof, verification, and are believed to be entirely certain (Positivist paradigm) |
Scientific claims - as these now include explicit attention to the role of the observer's perspective in shaping the claim - e.g., relativity theory, quantum mechanics, etc.)
Philosophical claims? perhaps "quasi-universal" standards can emerge through dialogue, careful attention to argument and evidence, etc.
Religious claims? "proof", reasons can be acknowledged to be "person relative" - without giving up rationality, the quest for truth altogether (as a form, technique, process whose content may vary from individual to individual, culture to culture) |
Aesthetic judgments, judgments of "taste" are often (perhaps wrongly) thought of as "subjective" in this sense, as in: "There's no accounting for taste," "Chacun son goût" [To each his own (in matters of) taste"] |
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Absolutist - there is a single set of standards/criteria with universal validity upon which certain judgments may be founded --> different claims are certainly wrong |
Pluralist - "many things go" as diverse interpretations/ applications/ understandings of a quasi-univeral set of truth and values - but not all things go |
Relativist - "anything goes," because there are no standards or criteria with validity beyond the individual with which we might judge. |
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Rational argument - coupled with empirical observation - will get us everywhere, i.e., a complete, god-like knowledge of the way things really are. |
Rational argument will get us somewhere - help us reject the clearly fallacious, sort out the better and worse arguments, perhaps land us with consensus judgments (open to further revision, interpretation in light of new evidence, contexts, etc.) |
Rational argument will get us nowhere (except as a means of sophistry and persuasion to help us achieve the power needed to fulfill our desires.) |
II: Examples of a pluralist rationality?
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The Symposium: : eros = the desire for completeness, beginning at the level of body and appetite, and concluding in the vision of beauty as such (for those possessed of an erotic reason) Crito: Never do evil. [see Socrates' Argument, The Crito] Republic: justice = the harmonic health of the psyche ("soul") // city, as each element (reason/spirit/appetite) performs its proper function; the good human being = the one who fulfills his capacities as an embodied psyche , and thereby achieves eudaimonia ("happiness" or well-being) --> The just human being as the "happiest" human being. The ideas as the most real things [see "Ideas as the Most Real Things"] --> political revolution: "what is" the case, as revealed by empirical observation, will only tell us that the status quo is "right." To argue that things ought to be different - e.g., we should abolish slavery and discrimination, women should be treated as the equals of men - requires a standpoint "outside" "what is." (Cf. Locke and Jefferson's arguments for why we ought to have a democracy [though such things were not visible empirically], Martin Luther King's arguments for ending segregation [though segregation was certainly "what is"], etc.) | |
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Eudiamonia as a moral universal (which, like health, is applied/understood/interpreted in different ways depending on the particulars of a given situation); application of moral universals involves the synthesis of theoretical/practical reason + aisthesis (sense-perception), where aisthesis delivers to reason the particulars of a given context. (Theory must be tested in praxis.) Eudaimonia results from actualizing one's potentials as a human being (=theoretical/practical reason in synthesis with sense, body, emotions, etc.) in ethical/political/contemplative life Knowledge as primarily through aisthesis [see Aristotle's Virtue Ethics] --> political conservativism: "what is" the case, as revealed by empirical observation, will only tell us that the status quo is "right." Hence, slavery and patriarchy, revealed everywhere by the senses, are what ought to be the case. | |
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Augustine // Kant |
Time as "subjective," but "intersubjectively universal." |
A contemporary pluralist/rationalist: Habermas's "communicative reason" and the rules of discourse
Certain kinds of discourse - as the primary expressions of communicative reason - presuppose the validity of our claims beyond the expression of individual preference.
For example, when we argue about the injustice of slavery and oppression, our very arguing about these values assumes that
(a) our valuing freedom is more than an individual preference - i.e., it is a value valid for all human beings, and
(b) we can persuade others of this belief - precisely through discourse and argument.
We further seem to agree that
in such discourse, the "unforced force" of the better argument should prevail - especially in discourse about important claims to truth (e.g., in sciences, law, and aesthetics)
The "unforced force," however, is often overridden in our discussions by various forms of force - appeals to power, threat, intimidation, etc. - resulting in repression and inequality.
In order to "immunize" our discourse against force, repression, and inequality - Habermas argues for a set of rules and conditions which should foster discursive equality, freedom, and fair play:
No one with the competency to speak and act may be excluded from discourse;
everyone is allowed to question and/or introduce any assertion whatever as well as express her attitudes, desires, and needs;
no one may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising these rights.
In addition, our exchange of views requires solidarity, meaning, an empathic perspective-taking in which we not only seek to intellectually understand the argument of the Other - but also seek to empathically feel how the Other would be impacted by norms under discussion. (In this way, Habermas echoes the Aristotelian synthesis of theoretical reason/practical reason/aisthesis.)
Taken together, these conditions circumscribe an ideal speech situation, one in which, Habermas argues, the members of a given discourse community may come to consensus on important norms for their community. This consensus would mean, in other terms, that the norms we live under are norms of our own choosing - and thus are expressions of our freedom, rather than restrictions of our freedom.
Moreover, such norms have a greater validity beyond individual preference - they are "quasi-universal," "relative absolutes," which, like claims to truth in the natural sciences and some religious traditions, are open to further discussion, revision in light of new evidence and argument, etc.
Habermas argues, finally, that this sort of communicative reason and discourse are presupposed in our preferences for democratic forms of government - and that the discourse ethics and the ideal speech situation are at the same time necessary conditions for both democratic forms of discourse and democratic forms of government.
[For more information on Habermas, see "Introduction to Habermas's Discourse Ethics"]
But - Habermas would be the first to ask - does any of this work in praxis...?
In a recent application of Habermas's discourse ethics, Protestants and Catholics debated the various issues raised by the abortion question. While the expected differences quickly emerged (on such questions as "When does human life begin?" "Is abortion ever permissable - and if so, under what conditions?" etc.) - a surprising consensus also emerged in the exchange, a consensus which holds together three distinct moments of (1) intractable and irresoluble disagreement, (2) agreement on the same fundamental values and goals, and (3) agreement on the means of achieving these goals and values, while these means at the same time reflect intractable differences between participants and the religious communities they represent.
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Absolutist/positivist "answer" |
(2) Common ground |
(3) pluralism/ complementarity |
(1) irreducible disagreements |
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(one right answer: all other answers wrong) |
abortion is not a positive good |
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when human life begins - diverse answers from Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish perspectives - because of... |
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the world would be a better place if we could alleviate the conditions that tempt us to take the abortion option in the first place |
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different theological starting points, e.g. the incarnational theology of the Roman Catholic Church, resulting in... |
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education is an important means towards achieving this goal |
our educational programs will have different content, reflecting different confessional standpoints - but they can aim at the same goal of reducing the need for abortion in the first place. |
different stresses on biology as strongly determining our response to "when does human life begin?" -- vs. more metaphysical understandings of personhood as separate from biology; |
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belief that there is a consensus on when life begins (a consensus consistent with the Roman Catholic position) vs. belief that there is considerable pluralism, leading to... |
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different degrees of openness towards pluralistic understanding of viewpoints, including Judaism |
(see the discussion archives of Forum III: Abortion - Religious Perspectives, a part of the Academic Dialogue on Applied Ethics)
Consequences for postmodern critiques of Western traditions as dualistic, excessively rationalistic?