Comments on Averroes and his prefiguring the doctrine of the two-fold truth
Faith and Reason - three options:
Two-fold truth
Philosophy (including natural science) as the Handmaiden of Theology
Complementarity - Aquinas
Ess's Summary: the role of religious frameworks in the development of natural philosophy from the PreSocratics through the Middle Ages
Note how theological problems result in conceptual changes --> new science.
Debate over "consubstantiation"
- vs. Aristotle's insistence on substance/accident metaphysics.
Averroes (ibn Rushd: b. 1126)
"...made no effort to reconcile Aristotle with his [Muslim] orthodoxy, nor did his reason bow down before his faith." Rather, he seems to have kept the two distinct in a way which prefigures the Western Medieval doctrine of the double-truth: "two incompatible assertions are held to be true at the same time." (127)
[Also possible, however, that
he did not hold to such a doctrine. Rather, in a document made
known to the West only in the 19th ct., "...he posited three
types of people: the masses who accept the authority and literal
word of Scripture, the theologians who are satisfied with probably
arguments, and the scientists who require the absolute demonstrations
of reason. The latter he warned to keep their demonstrations to
themselves, lest they destroy the faith of the former. The purpose
of revelation is to teach right practice and knowledge of God.
On the other hand, the duty of the elite is to remain silent,
refraining from allegorical interpretations which serve only to
confuse the undisciplined and the uneducated." (127)]
Partly as refined by Averroes,
Aristotle's system is integrated into Western universities --
so much so that Aristotle is "The Philosopher" and Averroes
"The Commentator."
Doctrine of the two-fold truth
articulated by Siger of Brabant: "...obnoxious principles
which were in opposition to faith could not be disproved by reason
and were, in fact, necessary truths. Revealed truth could not,
therefore, be the province of reason, only of faith. All else,
the science of the physical world, belonged to reason." (127f.)
OPTION TWO: PHILOSOPHY/SCIENCE AS HANDMAIDEN OF THEOLOGY (THE "QUEEN" OF THE SCIENCES")
Theologians' response: they
in turn "...employed Aristotelian logical concepts to elucidate
articles of faith, following the older tradition [i.e., of Augustine's
use of reason to defend Christian principles -- a use reflecting
especially Augustine's Neoplatonism] if not the Greek heritage
of Christianity itself [i.e., in its background of the Wisdom
Literature of late Judaism (as reflecting Hellenistic notions
of an ordered creation) and in the Gospel of John and Paul's Hellenistic
categories (i.e., logos, the Greek split between body and
soul, etc.) as shaping the Christology and theology of the Church].
Deductive logic demonstrates truth by necessity. Hence
if the truths deduced from faith were necessary, the contradictory
truths of natural science must be merely probable [in Plato's
terms, a "likely story"]. But this is to lose all scientific
significance, for science becomes nothing more than a plaything
of the human mind." (128)
In short, there is the effort
to (re-)establish the subordination of philosophy/science under
revelation by claiming the status of necessary truth for
faith-claims, as bolstered by deductive demonstrations, thus rendering
science to "merely probable" claims -- over against
the claims of the followers of Aristotle and Averroes that this
science provided necessary truth.
--> Giles of Rome, Errors of the Philosophers (critique of Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Moses Maimonides: between 1270 and 1274)
--> the Condemnation of
1277, bishop Etienne Tempier, Paris
OPTION THREE: SCHOLASTICISM, COMPLEMENTARITY -- AQUINAS
"...the task of scholasticism:
to effect a separation of Aristotelianism from its unchristian
elements, granting its autonomy in questions of physical science
while integrating it into a larger metaphysical whole. Theologians
like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas felt themselves free
to criticize specific points -- unlike Averroes, who accepted
everything the Greek philosopher had uttered -- yet their comprehensive
reconciliation created a definite reluctance in themselves and
in others to reject the entire edifice." (128)
[Note the complex interplay:
a religious standpoint provides a basis for attacking the
authority of Aristotle on specific points (i.e., religion works
to keep philosophy/science from becoming dogmatic) -- but once
Aristotle is integrated into a framework of theology, as a religious
edifice it tends to reinforce Averroes' dogmatic approach to "The
Philosopher."]
Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus)
on alchemy: "...an occult
art, he has yet given a natural account of its process;
in essence, his 'magic' is based upon natural causes. Like Aristotle,
Albert seems to be telling us that nature operates according to
necessary laws. As a Christian he must accept miracles; on the
other hand, it appears that God (and the alchemist) works magical
events through natural causes. While we may not comprehend the
Divine Will, we are still free to investigate the workings of
that Will upon physical phenomena. Hence it seems to be the essence
of the occult which lies beyond the realm of science and not its
phenomenal instrumentation in nature." (129f.)
A. comments that "The
'otherworldly' label which is often applied to the Middle Ages,
implying that medieval people had little interest in nature, seems
to be inapplicable to Albert. In fact, the statement may not apply
to medieval people in general. Look at the great cathedrals, says
historian Lynn Thorndike: the artists who chiseled the figures
of animals, plants, and birds knew better than the scholar....With
reverence and faithfulness they carved into stone their observations
of the natural world. They were 'Darwins with a chisel.' Yet we
must not forget that they were still building cathedrals and not
theories. Albert was a theologian, and his metaphysics was as
important to him as his science. Like the great cathedrals, his
thought encompassed both realms." (130, w/ reference to:
Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science,
Vol. II [New York: Macmillan, 1929], pp. 536-37. Cf. Edward Male,
Intermedia Document and accompanying illustration).
Aquinas
"...the first to create
a vast, specifically Christian metaphysic in which natural science
and revelation were each assigned their autonomous spheres while
ultimately springing from the same principle. For Aquinas there
simply cannot be two separate or contradictory truths; all knowledge
and hence all truth come from a single source." (130)
Notice how this approach --
while distinct from the doctrine of the two-fold truth -- also
provides a "theological justification of natural science"
[my phrase]: "...the act of Being which infuses these qualities
into the world makes for an immanent creator. All must reflect
the Creator, since all creatures participate in being, though
in varying degrees. Human knowledge of being derives from the
senses and the rationalistic science of Aristotle. But God as
pure Being is the source of both movement and existence; in short,
God is the radiating center of reality. Hence if nature is rational,
God must be rational, and in the end all knowledge must derive
from Him." (130)
[ --> an especially Neoplatonic
conception of Being // Knowledge, but one originally seen in Plato
(Republic) and Augustine.]
"Underlying all science,
in whatever form it assumes, is the ultimate principle of being
-- existence as such. The sciences study specific beings -- parts
of Being, so to speak -- and therefore should not be confused
in either methods or content with that science, metaphysics, which
studies existence per se. Thus metaphysics does not depend
completely upon the content of Aristotelian science, for no single
scientific methodology could monopolize the sum total of Being
in all its complexity." So, while science and metaphysics
are distinct, "...autonomous realms, answering fundamentally
different questions," they are "totally compatible under
his analysis of Being." (131)
And, "It is no wonder,
then, that Aquinas in adopting Aristotelian logic to a profound
metaphysic would see these same principles operating in the physical
world." (131)
Summa Theologia
Adopts the view of Maimonides that "Ptolemy's constructions are hypotheses to save the appearances but that it is possible they may be saved some other way." (131)
There is apparently scholarly
debate as to what this means:
--> distinction between
probable empirical theories and necessary philosophical
[theological] demonstrations?
--> an effort "to
rescue the material Aristotelian spheres." Along these lines,
Aquinas distinguished between three heavens:
the Empyrean
the crystalline (the firmament of Genesis)
the sidereal sphere (seven
planets and the fixed stars)
A mention here of John Sacrobosco, author of Tractatus de sphere, "the most famous textbook on astronomy in the thirteenth century...." Uses only one Primum Mobile as the outermost sphere which moves east to west.
"Bernard of Verdun accepted
these constructions but held that they account for the variation
of the material orbs which carry the planets and not the
planets themselves. Like the Arabs, he assumed that the epicycle
is located within the thickness of the eccentric orb. Aquinas,
too may have sought to reconcile Ptolemy and Aristotle by adapting
the reality of the Aristotelian spheres to the hypothetical geometrical
rendering of the phenomena by Ptolemy. Aquinas also considered
the [heliocentric] theories of Heraclides of Pontus and Aristarchus
of Samos, only to reject them by Aristotelian arguments."
(131)
Note as well the notion of
the limits of science as a rational approach to knowledge
(whereby Aquinas prefigures Kant and more contemporary
[i.e., post-Newtonian, instrumentalist] views in important ways).
Aquinas, of course, could
not follow Aristotle and Averroes in positing an eternal world
without beginning or end. Nonetheless, he did see in their arguments
a certain persuasiveness and thus decided that the question did
not fall into the domain of science. Aristotle's arguments, according
to Aquinas, do not conclude with strict necessity, yet the arguments
raised against him are not necessary either. Infinity and eternity
are simply beyond the realm of physical science, since we experience
neither in the physical world. (132)
Note as well the discussion
of the void (pp. 132f.) Briefly, Aquinas rejects the Aristotelian/Averroean
arguments that there can be no void [because, given their theory
of motion, in a void motion would be instantaneous -- which, on
the evidence of the stars, is manifestly false]. The rejection
seems motivated by theological considerations -- namely,
that "to say that it is impossible for the void to exist
places some rather severe limitations on the power of God."
(133) This leads Aquinas to modify the Aristotelian conception
of motion:
Now Aquinas still followed
Aristotle in holding that the medium is necessary for violent
(dynamic) motion - in order to continue it. Nonetheless, he took
an important step by defining the state of "being in motion"
as a condition of the mobile body in relationship to a spatial
frame of reference. (133)
While "Aquinas remained
a metaphysician and did not follow through his own implications...."
this step is, as Alioto notes, is an instance in which Aquinas'
metaphysics [and theology] serve as a motive for "scientific
demonstrations" which "seem to us to be leading in fruitful
directions...." (133) That is, for theological reasons,
Aquinas modifies the Aristotelian doctrine of motion and void
in such a way as to make void a legitimate concept.
--> recall the problems
of the concept of the void in the PreSocratics:
Briefly, until the concept of the void was made possible by the atomists -- we seemed to be stuck with a Parmenidean framework which, in its insistence that "only what is, is," resulted in a concept of "The One," of Being as an underlying reality, knowable only by the mind, and utterly divorced from the realm of sense-experience.
To recall, the atomists essentially
redefined "what is" so that it would have two meanings:
(a) a material something, or (b) the space in which material things
move. (See the class notes, "Outline," on the Ancient
Period [also on Intermedia]: I.C. [Parmenides], and I.D.3 [Democritus-Lucretius:
the arguments for atomism].)
--> this contributes to
a crucial step in the development of subsequent astronomical theories,
especially if they are to move from instrumentalist accounts,
merely mathematical "hypotheses" -- to realist
accounts of the actual motion of stars and planets through a vacuum.
Similarly, with reference
to Aquinas' mystical experience and the Aurora Consurgens
(Rising Dawn) which uses "alchemical terms as vehicles
to express spiritual truths which have little to do with the ultimate
goal of physical transmutation." (133)
Gold seems to represent the
uncorrupted spirit, the divine idea or form imprisoned in corrupting
matter, and the process of transmutation signifies the raising
of the alchemist's soul, his intellectual form, to a mystical
gnosis. The actual transmutation of gold seems to be but
the physical counterpart of the real spiritual transformation.
It is possible only because such a liberated soul can work magical
effects in the physical world. (133)
Ess's Summary: the role of religious frameworks in the development of natural philosophy from the PreSocratics through the Middle Ages
This "spiritual"
or religious framework for what looks in our eyes to be
at least a primitive form of science or interest in the physical
order of things should not be a surprise. On the contrary, we
will see this religious motivation persist in the work
of the "natural philosophers" or scientists at least
through Copernicus and Kepler,
if not on into Darwin and Einstein. As well, recall here that
the split between science and religion which we may take as definitive
of science is -- so far -- rather episodic in historical terms.
That is:
(a) while there are occasional figures in philosophy (Xenophanes, the Sophists, the atomists) who see their rational form of knowledge as exclusive of "religious" issues;
(b) while especially an Augustinian
or, better, Tertullian understanding of Christianity rejects or
subordinates rational knowledge;
more predominantly -- so far
-- we have seen philosophy/science largely integrated with,
if not orthodox religious views, views which are nonetheless
marked by:
(a) an acceptance of moral values as having at least as much reality or significance in one's theory (beginning with the PreSocratics); and
(b) an emphasis on the rational pursuit of knowledge as either working in concert with religious claims (some early Christians; Islamic philosopher/scientists; Aquinas; Francis and the Franciscans) or as its own path to a form of "salvation" which, while independent of orthodox religious frameworks, looks largely "religious" (e.g., Pythagoreans; Plato; Aristotle; alchemy).