Stress Points: Pine, ch. 4, "Cultural Roots: 1. The Ancient Greeks"
Dr. Ess - Fall, 1998
For Pine, the fundamental inheritance we owe to the Greeks is the belief in natural law.
This needs fleshing out somewhat:
"natural" vs. "supernatural" as a distinction that took several generations to develop - along with the very notion of "nature" [physis] as the appropriate object of philosophy/science investigations [cf. Anaximander, 611-545 B.C.E.]
Pine is correct (p. 108) to point out the roots of this belief in Greek myth - the notion of dike, an eternal order of justice that even the gods/goddesses are subordinate to.
Logos - at least by the time of Heraclitus - not on his list (but see the web site on history of ancient philosophy) - this term was used (along with kosmos) to describe the underlying order of things. Indeed:
Logos (human reason) is capable of understanding
the logos (the underlying order of things) -
and giving an account or explanation - a logos - of that order
Also: we derive from the Presocratics, beginning with Thales, a structure of explanation that is still in use today. (This structure, however, is also marked by essentially religious origins - the mode of geneological thinking apparent in much myth.)
Also: what Pine does not explain for you is the role of philosophical argument in the development of both specific ideas we now think of as "scientific," e.g.
An evolutionary beginning to human beings
[Anaximander, 611-545 B.C.E.]
A heliocentric (sun-centered) universe
[Pythagoreans, 3rd ct. B.C.E.]
An atomistic theory (including materialism and some form of determinism)
[The atomists, 4th ct. B.C.E.]
But also what we might think of as fundamental assumptions, frameworks, etc., necessary to the process of natural science, namely
Just the structure of explanation (how to hold together both a "being/seeming" or "reality/appearance" distinction which maps out
the difference between the explanans ["explainer"] and explanandum [what is explained] so as avoid logical circularity, while also mapping out
the connection between the explanans and explanandum - so that a genuine explanation is accomplished.
The belief in mathematics as a reliable tool of inquiry into nature (esp. Anaximander, Pythagoreans, Plato),
The importance of empirical verification of theoretical claims (as early as Anaximenes [?-499])
The problem of epistemological relativism
Relatively quickly, however, the PreSocratic effort to understand the world rationally - however impressive, and fundamental, these accomplishments may be, issues in just the problem Pine describes under the heading of "Protagoras and the Sophists" (112f.)
Beyond the arguments (now familiar) for relativism offered by Protagoras and others - Pine is right, I think, to note that "Relativism is not so much a philosophy as it is an epistemological ghost that materializes whenever people become tired of seeking." (114)
It is also self-contradictory (see the quote from Plato, Theatetus, p. 114).
Part of the Socratic/Platonic strategy, in fact, is to break through the apparent dilemma or dichotomy between absolutism/dogmatism and relativism, to a middle-ground which recognizes the limits of our efforts at knowledge (thus avoiding absolutism/dogmatism) while also avoiding relativism. [Cf. web notes on the Socratic/Platonic project.]
Pine is correct to point out that much of the Socratic/Platonic argument here turns on the interesting epistemological and ontological status of mathematical concepts - expressed most clearly, perhaps, in the analogy of the line.
This analogy correlates nicely with the allegory of the cave.
Further possible points:
Plato certainly recognized the distinction we are learning between instrumentalist and correspondance theories of truth - and that any mathematically-based theory about reality might be instrumentally "true" (i.e., it might "work"), but this does not mean it is "true" in the correspondance sense.
In fact, this recognition leads Plato to emphasizing the importance of making sure our theories do correlate strongly with what we observe. In his phrase, we must always be sure to "save the appearances," - i.e., not be satisified with a theory which threatens to abandon our fundamental experience of ordinary reality (such as Parmenides' arguments which reduce that experience to illusion). (cf. Pine, 117, 123)
As we will see in the next chapter, it is just "Plato's homework problem" - to save the appearances of astronomical observation - that lead to the Copernican Revolution.
As Pine is correct to point out, however, the correlation between mathematics and reality is a fundamental puzzle (124f. ) What needs to be added here is that the Medievals should not be overlooked as far as contibutions to the foundations of the Copernican Revolution, and the Scientific Revolution in general are concerned. (See related materials on the web site).
In fact, the Medieval (esp. Franciscan) attitude towards science and religion (explain) is, contrary to Pine's assertion (124) becoming increasingly common among contemporary scientists (e.g., the COBE scientist who sees in his map of the cosmic background radiation reflecting the initial distribution of matter and energy in the Big Bang "God's blueprint for creation").