Michal Kyle

Dr. Charles Ess

Phil. Of Science

2 May 2000

Part V Realism vs. Anti-Realism

Critical Silences in Scientific Discourse:

Problems of Form and Re-Form

Evelyn Fox Keller

 

Part I Introduction (The Question I Would Like to Ask)

Keller’s view of scientific knowledge–

· "Scientific theories neither mirror nor correspond to reality." (397)

· Scientific theories are models (397)

-models of

-models for

· Scientific theories "represent ‘in order to intervene’ (in the world of material reality)

"For this reason, I prefer to call them (theories) tools."

(for changing the world) (397)

· Theories are invented, crafted, constructed by humans with human subjects and nonhuman subjects/objects

· "…the effectiveness of these tools in changing the world has something to do with the relation between theory and reality." (despite the absence of one-to-one correspondence)

Theories that "work", that "lead to actions on things and people that…appear to be independent of any belief system---they, must be said to possess a kind of ‘adequacy’ in relation to a world that is not itself constituted symbolically–a world we might designate as ‘residual reality’." (398)

· "world of ‘residual reality"-"larger than any possible constructed representation we might construct" (398)

 

Problem: "All these differences seem to reveal a space indicating the operation of choice in the construction of scientific knowledge. Yet the moment we attempt to juxtapose the representational plasticity of scientific theories with their instrumental efficacy, this space seems to disappear before our eyes, leaving in its place an aura of inevitability." (398)

Keller wants to identity what she calls the "chronic ellipsis" in the way that relativist’s have defended various scientific "stories" as working while failing to specify what they work at. (398)

-not sufficient to call scientific knowledge instrumentalist without admitting that science as a tool is aimed toward something

-If we admit that scientific knowledge is not without aim then--"In what other ways might science work?" (398)

-What criteria do we use to measure science’s instrumental success?

Keller aims to expose the influence of ambitious scientific goals (such as the Human Genome Project) have on the structure and form of the theories that realize them.

"…there is reason to suspect that somewhere in the project of genetics there is already contained not only the possibility but the expectation of eugenics, just as the anticipation of explosive power is somewhere contained in the project of nuclear physics. But none of us, it seems is able to say much about where, and how." (399)

How could we possibly show the influence of such ambitions on the theories that realize them? –Keller sees this as a "sensible" question to be asking, and one that requires urgent attention.

What keeps us from addressing it?–This is her the primary concern:

"So this essay is not about re-visioning or reforming science, but about the obstacles such an effort encounters, especially in relation to physics."

She also offers some suggestions as to get beyond these obstacles.

 

Part II Some Obstacles in the Way

Physics: The Ideology of "Pure" Science

Keller’s early "picture" of physics as learned from the scientific community:

"…at its best, science was pure in all the senses"

in the sense of–autonomous, virtuous, absolute, elitist, abstract, conceptual, theoretical immaculate, unblemished, virginal, "perhaps above all"–innocent and blameless

the antithesis of pure innocent, blameless science: applied science

"…this complex and multifunctional vision of a pure, autonomous science carries with it, or perhaps I should say is premised on, the certitude of a clear demarcation between pure and applied between science and technology." (400)

"with this demarcation, all responsibility for what changes are effected, for the choice of direction in which the world is moved,

is disowned–that responsibility is located squarely in the lap of applied science, technology, or even better politics." (400)

Keller suggest that the notion of science as pure might be said to have found its "ultimate representation" in the Institute for Advanced Study and calls this ironic in light of the history surrounding the founding and development of the organization. (400)

-World War II triggered a transformation in American science that made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between theoretical and applied science

-Hiroshima and Nagasaki alternately seen as the beginning of or the climax of the convergence between pure and applied science precipitated by WWII

-Funds for "pure" research increased at the same rate that funds for applied research during the war and in the years following based on the rationale that "our national security rests on superior science" (401)

 

Myth surrounding Einstein (401)

Myths of this sort "work to sustain belief in the a priori aimlessness and essential purity of scientific knowledge, even in the face of the unprecedented dangers that knowledge has enabled." (402)

Those who worked toward developing the atom-bomb…

Pairing Einstein with the A-bomb works to deny the directness of scientific research and practice.

"…our confidence in the purity of scientific knowledge…works, in turn, to foreclose the questions we would otherwise ask about the aims of science, about the ways in which both the form and content of scientific knowledge have been shaped by the motivations driving it…" (402)

"Most crucially, such confidence prevents us from thinking about the possibility of redirecting science, of doing it differently. For how can one redirect a venture that has no direction?" (402)

History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science:

The Focus on Truth OR Consequences, But Never Both

"In these various ways, all of the disciplines devoted to analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge tacitly cooperated in demarcating the internal dynamics of science from its social and political influences." (403)

historians of science–by concentrating on the "strictly cognitive development" of science

philosophers of science–by embracing logical positivism

by privileging questions of truth over questions of consequence

sociologists of science---by their focus on the professionalization of scientists, treating scientific knowledge as a commodity

Studies on the character of American science were "largely confined to the subject of external (that is, political or social) changes in the relation of society (or government) to science." Subsequently, questions of the influence of social and political factors on scientific knowledge weren’t asked. This in turn preserves the dual view of science as "an intrinsic good" and as worthy of support due to its usefulness. (403)

 

"…the particular content, even if not the form, of our knowledge may well depend on where we invest our energies." (403)

Questions of what is thinkable or possible were labeled the concerns of ethics and policy, not questions for history, philosophy, or sociology or science. (403)

Without an investigation of how the profile of scientific knowledge is affected we do not know whether content and form can be separated–"whether what is knowable or for that matter, from what we want to know, and of course, want to do.

The revolution of the past twenty-five years: "few people in the academy still believe in the inexorability, inevitability, or even purity of scientific truth–in the expanding sphere of light picture of scientific knowledge." (404)

Despite the our more sophisticated view of science we are still "met by the same impasse as before, though perhaps from the opposite side." (404)

"…sociologist of science have opted for a different (pretechnological) model of science for themselves: naturalist rather than empirical, descriptive rather than predictive; once again representing, not intervening." (404)

-However, these present naturalists lack the confidence in the basic order of things being good. (404)

-Questions of how scientific activity might be redirected remain unasked.

"It would appear that, when we were naïve realists, faithful to the ideals of pure science, we were either too timid or didn’t know how to ask; and as relativists, disabused of both "purity" and "scientificity," we somehow lost interest." (405)

Signs of Change

An "upsurge" of research activity on the impact of WWII on American science–"a necessary precursor to…the questions that Hacking, or I, want to ask." (405)

Some recognition on the part of researchers that scientific research is not pure.

Part III: Conclusion

A better understanding of how science works requisite to revisioning science:

"Scientific theories impinge on the real, but they do so selectively, not neutrally, effecting some kinds of change rather than others." (406)

"…we need to account for process by which such selectivity operates." (406)

Theories are produced by scientists and nonscientists working together with nonhuman subjects so that-

"…the effectiveness of the resulting theories must be judged in terms of all these interaction that generate them. These interactions internal and external together produce an interlocking system of needs…Intentionality might be said to be located in the production of this system of needs, consequentiality in its satisfaction." (406)

Much of what a successful research program must do "can be described strictly in human (psychosocial, political, and economic) terms".

It must be able to -generate jobs and doable projects

-offer explanations that provide aesthetic and emotional satisfaction

-work rhetorically to recruit students

-"win allies" (get grants) (406)

Science, particularly physics and molecular biology, "have succeeded in producing tools that appear to dissolve nature’s resistance to our own minds". (407) However, Keller urges us to consider "the almost equally remarkable particularity (perhaps even singularity" of our needs" (407).

We may be able to "satisfy a convergence of human interests that would be yielded by different social arrangements". (407)

We also may be able to realize a very limited number of possible goals at any one time. However, we may open the way to "alternative directions" by embedding the directionality of scientific work in its variable psychosocial and political context on the one side, and in the invariant capaciousness of its epistemic potential on the other…" (407)

Keller believes we have demonstrated our ability to get much of what we want by way of science. Now she suggests we put more thought into what we want. While our interests may be diverse she sees at least one common desire–that of survival. (408)