Referat:Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude and Critiques

Referat: Erica Samuelson ('99)

Part V. Realism versus Anti-Realism:

Contents

1) Notes on Arthur Fine's "The Ontological Import of Scientific Knowledge: the Natural Ontological Attitude"

2) James Robert Brown's critique of Fine's NOA

3) Robert Klee's critique of Fine's NOA

The Ontological Import Of Scientific Knowledge

The Natural Ontological Attitude

Arthur Fine

"REALISM IS DEAD"

"Its death was announced by the neopositivists who realized that they could accept all tbe results of science, including all tbe members of tbe scientific zoo." (386)

"Its death was certified as tbe last two generations of physical scientists turned their backs on realism and have managed, nevertheless to do science successfully without it." (386)

Now there is tbe task of finding a suitable successor. According to Fine the suitable successor is 'The Natural Ontological Attitude' (NOA).

The Three Parts:

* First: The arguments for realism are not sound, and they provide no rational support for belief in realism.

Argument: Support of realism tries to move from the necessity for a realist account of its practice.

Two flaws:

1) "Ground Level" (attaining to particular success)

a) Piggybacking from one theoretical tbeory to another.

b) Accounting for the success. How - the only and possibly the only way is on a realist basis.

"Second Level" (methodological level)

a) Focus on the methods embedded in scientific practice, methods teased out in ways that seem accurate and perceptive. (337)

b) Accounting for the success of these methods. How- The best and again perhaps the only truly adequate way of explaining the matter is on the basis of realism. (337)

"To argue for realism one must not beg the question as to the significance of explanatory hypotheses by assuming that they carry truth as well as explanatory efficacy." (387)

"The issue over realism is precisely as to whether we should believe in the reality of those individuals, properties, relations, processes, and so forth, used in well supported explanatory hypotheses." (387)

* Second: Fine refutes the view that only realism provides a progressive philosophy of science.

He does so first by way of the examples of Einstein’s 1905 paper on special relativity and then his later general relativity - both of which require, on his showing, an instrumentalist orientation rather than realism, if progress were to be made.

The same claim is then supported by reference to Heisenberg and Schrodinger’s abandonment of realism in forging quantum mechanics - resulting in a "nonrealist position…consolidated at the time of the famous Solvay conference, in October of 1927…." (389)

But Einstein, as is well known in the example of the EPR paradox, intended to counter the nonrealist assumptions of Quantum Mechanics, shifts from his early instrumentalism to realism:

The war between Einstein, the realist, and Bohr, the nonrealist, over the interpretation of quantum theory was not, I believe, just a sideshow in physics, nor an idle intellectual exercise. It was an important endeavor undertaken by Bohr on behalf of the enterprise of physics as a progressive science. For Bohr believed (and this fear was shared by Heisenberg, A. Sommerfield, W. Pauli, and M. Born - and all the major playors) that Einstein’s realism, if taken seriously, would block the consolidation and articulation of the new physics and, thereby, stop the progress of science. They were afraid, in particular, that Einstein’s realism would lead the next generation of the brightest and best students into scientific dead ends. (389)

On Fine’s showing, then, it is this combination of realism and antirealisms which has provided the progression and development of philosophy of science.

"Realism is used by most as a powerful instrument in the development of science, just as anti-realism is, rather than as expressing a 'big truth'." (389)

"The task of 'explaining' is the realist program for identifying a reality underlying the formulas of the theory and thereby explaining tbe predictive success of the formulas as approximately true descriptions of this reality." (390) This is not the only progressive philosophy of science.

* Third: The Nonrealist Position and the Natural Ontological Attitude

"Both realist and anti-realist must toe the 'homely line': They must both accept the certified results of science. This acceptance of scientific truths is the 'core position.' What distinguishes realists from antirealists, then, is what they add onto this core position." (392)

Anti-realist add-ons:

1) A particular concept of truth

2) Special analysis of concepts - idealism, constructivism, phenomenalism, empiricism

3) Certain methodological strictures

Realist add ons:

1) A desk-thumping, foot stamping shout of "REALLY"!!

The core position is neither realist nor anti-realist; it mediates between the two. (393) The core position is what Fine defines as 'common sense epistemology' or The Natural Ontological Attitude.

The Natural Ontological Attitude (Postrealism)

1) NOA counsels us to accept the results of science as true, so that a sentence is true just in case.

2) NOA ccmmits us, via truth, to tbe existence of the individuals, properties, relations, processes and so forth referred to by the scientific statements that we accept as true. (393)

1) Perhaps the greatest virtue of NOA is to call attention to just how minimal an adequate philosophy of science can be.

a) NOA helps us see that realism differs from various antirealisms in this way:

1) Realism adds an outer direction to NOA:

--> External world
--> Correspondence relation of approximate truth

2) Anti-realisms add an inner direction:

--> human-oriented reductions of truth, concepts or explanations. (394)

"NOA suggest that the legitimate features of these additions are already contained in the presumed egual status of everyday truths with scientific ones, and in our accepting them both as truths. No other additions are legitimate, and none are required." (393)

"NOA is not committed to the progressivism that seems inherent in realism." (393)

"NOA pretends no resource for settling 'truth' disputes." (394)

"NOA removes that 'correspondence to the external world'." (394)

NOA gives a commonality to all different philosophies towards the interpretation of science by which these philosophies can be compared and contrasted on neutral ground. Through the different philosophies combining via the use of NOA, this ensures the development and progress of science. Although NOA is not committed to "progressivism" of realism, NOA ensures progression through bringing all philosophies to this "common ground". NOA is independent of any labeled or philosophical category. It does not have to fit into any specific framework of principles, i.e., realism, anti-realism, empiricism, fundamentalism....

Conclusion: "For better philosophy I recommend NOA." (395)

Critique of Arthur Fine's

Natural Ontological Attitude

James Robert Brown

"Realism, Antirealism, and NOA" Pages 340-342

Scientific Inquiry: Klee

Brown asserts that Fine assumes:

1) Simply accepts the assertions of science at face value.

2) The "common-sense" reading of scientific assertions is the right one.

Perhaps NOA is realism:

Realism is just a reflective attempt to defend the 'natural', unreflective, common-sensical reading of the assertions of science. (340)

Perhaps NOA is realism without defence:

Fine criticizes realists and antirealists then NOA 'wins' by default. I'm inclined to see NOA as less the formulation of an ontological point of view than the ventilation of impatience with a perennial philosophical problem. (340)

Definition problems: What exactly is a realist / anti-realist?

"The analogue of NOA wouId be to take the Bible at face value. This we might imagine to be done until it is pointed out that certain geological and biological facts are incompatible with Genesis. (Thus, Fundamentalists and atheists are created.) These rival philosophical views inevitably arise and displace the unreflective 'natural' reading of the Bible. NOA is the initial outlook - in science or theology - but it cannot be the final one." (342)

Critique of Arthur Fine's

Natural Ontological Attitude

Robert Klee

"The Actual Way Things Really Are" (Pages 236-238)

Introduction To The Philosophy Of Science

Fine assumes:

1) Realism presupposes a correspondence account of truth of a roughly Kantian sort.

2) Antirealist theories of truth are simply dressed up forms of "behaviorism" which attempts to analyze the meaning of a central philosophy, concept, truth, solely in terms of the differences its use makes to human intercourse.

Definition problem: "I do not think that antirealists concepts of truth are necessarily behavioristic in the sense Fine claims." (237)

Klee argues that there are not two distinct types of realism.

"We must reject the Kantian metaphysics in which the phenomena/noumena distinction is characterized as a difference between possible and impossible epistemological accessibility." (236)

"NOA seems like obvious inconsistent fence-sitting. Why should we accept the results of science 'as it is' with Fine's argument that nothing about science 'as it is' suggests that its theories are true rather than false?" (238)

Worse yet, the massive convergent success of science simply goes unexplained under NOA." (238)

Richard Schlagel:

"I find it utterly implausible that Fine could be serious when he argues that explanatory success could have nothing at all to do with truth." (238)

"If Fine is right, concerning NOA being uncommitted to the progression of science, then we are not justified in being fairly sure that physics has progressed since the theories of Anaximander 2500 years ago." (23S)

"Fine and the anti-realists are amazed that realists seem so lunkheaded as not to see how clearly they are begging the question. Realists are just as amazed that Fine and the antirealists seem so obtuse of mind as not to be embarrassed that they have no explanation whatsoever for what obviously cries out for explanation: the massive convergent success cf the sciences." (238)

"But what other criterion for truth in science could there be but what works nearly always, works in many different contexts, tends to spread in its workings to related domains, and works at a level of fine-grained (usually quantitative) detail that would positively daze the rest of the world if it knows of it?" (238)