Initial comments on contrast between ancient/medieval - and modern (Aristotle) - a contrast centrally marked in terms of a shift from a logic of complementarity to a logic of dualism, beginning with the split between reason and faith in the doctrine of the two-fold truth (Scotus).
This split develops first of all in terms of new political theory which begins to divorce religious authority from the political domain - a shift Jones traces through
Aristotle as an instance of both ancient and classical views -- against which modern world reacts.
I. Aristotle's four causes -- including final cause and the resulting teleological view.
A. Illustrates logic of connection in the face of difference in two ways:
ii. diversity of four causes is not an obstacle to their unity; rather, an analysis of all four causes is required for a complete view of things. A "pluralism" operates here which, we shall see, becomes uncommon in the modern period.
i. the doctrine of the two-fold truth -- beginning with
John Duns Scotus (1265-1307)
Notes:
b) this split will be further paralleled by the split between sacred and secular authorities in the political realm, starting with Dante (ca. 1300) -- and extending through:
Machiavelli (1469-1527)
Bodin (1530-1596)
ii. the increasing focus on efficient causality as the only legitimate domain of analysis.
II. Attitude towards interest -->
B. Modern development of capitalism -- refer here to handout modifying Jones' easy acceptance of the claim that Protestantism and capitalism go hand in hand.
Wanted to get rid of interference of the Pope in political, especially "national" affairs; this leads to his attempting to establish a separation (read: dualism) between secular rule and spiritual competency. See p. 18 for the flavor of this separation.
Notice that his justification for doing so is peculiarly "Protestant." He attacks the tradition of the Church -- which previously had been considered a manifestation of divine will and thus a decisive authority -- and makes Scripture the ultimate authority
The difference or split which Dante introduces between sacred and secular authorities becomes a radical separation in Marsiglio.
Argues not simply for the difference between sacred and secular (a difference Jones labels in terms of the independence of temporarl power in Dante) -- but for the supremacy of temporal power.
He does so on the basis of the Occam/Averroist doctrine of the two-fold truth:
Since in the prevailing Christian worldview, law is dependent on revelation -- this split means that now some account of secular, temporal law becomes necessary which can justify or legitimate law on some basis other than revelation. Here, Marsiglio is almost "modern."
M. defines law this way:
The matter remains ambiguous, however: as Jones further points out, "... since Marsiglio defined law in terms of will, it would seem to follow that any decision the ruler can enforce has the status of law."(21)
The point to be made here: the modern "crisis of reason" is in part a crisis having to do with the question of legitimating values -- e.g., political rights. What we can see here is that the possibility of such a crisis is opened up by first, the separation, and secondly, the radical split between the centrally moral domain of the sacred and the secular domain of the political.
That is, the problematic character of modern politics, in particular, -- i.e., the problem of how to justify the fundamental values of political institutions as based on reason, not revelation -- is already apparent in Marsiglio. To put it in terms of a question: what compels us to accept, as Marsiglio does, the "citizens" or "the majority" as a legitimate authority? Why not simply will or power as the source of authority -- a response people in fact began to make rather quickly?
Bodin (1530-1596) makes the first attempt answer this sort of question -- and does so (against the background of the spread of Lutheranism) by way of the concept of sovereignty
the gang of robbers is different from the state "because it lacks the principal mark of a peaceful society, namely, a lawful government according to the laws of nature." (quoted in Jones, 22)
Q: what are the laws of nature?
As Jones points out, by the appeal to the laws of nature, Bodin harks back to classical and medieval political theory which assumes the existence of a set of absolute norms -- now stated in terms of natural law. BUT where the older tradition has used absolute norms in a normative or prescriptive fashion
-- Bodin is further modern in his focus on power. And this focus on power shifts the approach of the political theorist from the prescriptive - to the merely descriptive. ("Description" is what one does when s/he despairs of having access to the absolute norms needed to make prescriptive judgments and statements.)
So far as there is some focus on norms -- the norm or absolute good seems to be establishing a condition of peace and security; notice that in Bodin's view, to do so requires concentrating power into the hands of one man. Given the conditions of his time -- this is not too implausible. NB that it anticipates Hobbes' more radical approach at the end of the 1500's.
This further means that our interest shifts away from discussion of rights, moral justifications of political systems, etc. to simple descriptions of what techniques or means work best for acquiring and maintaining power. See Jone, p. 23.
There is some subtle suggestion here of the later materialist claim that religion is merely an ideology which is convenient for maintaining obedience and stability.