Notes - Locke (1632 - 1704)

I. Recall cultural/scientific climate --

1687 Newton's Principia
1688 Glorious Revolution

(a) empiricist approach
(b) optimism regarding reason

reason;

human control over our own destiny;

progress through technology;

utopianism -- including democracy
 

So -- go through

(I) ethics and politics which follow from his
empiricist epistemology ,
then return to
(II) "seeds of destruction" contained in his
epistemology as suggestive of the crisis of reason which becomes full blown in the 19th/20th centuries.

A. Epistemology and the Limits of Reason qua instrument

Notice, to begin with, the "Kantian" resolution to his inquiry concerning human understanding -- namely, that the mind qua instrument is not suited for metaphysics in the sense of speculation about what cannot be ascertained by the senses.

What is "typisch modern" here -- an epistemological account which justifies the rejection of the tradition and the need to start de novo.

B. The Good = Pleasure

As we might expect from an empiricist approach, "the good" now can only equal what is observable -- and so pleasure suggests itself as the only final goal.

This is somewhat Platonic in the sense that -- given that pleasure is a simple idea, and that everyone knows what it is -- everyone is "built" to pursue the good, namely pleasure. This leads, however, to the problem of akrasia, of doing what I know to be bad -- not because I fail to know that it is bad (i.e., ignorance of the good) but because ?

Locke's response, however, is not Platonic -- it is empiricist: there is a (verifiable) psychological root to the bad will -- i.e., a kind of "foreshortening" which makes it difficult for the mind to keep clearly before it the long-term consequences (pains and pleasures) of its current choices.

Distinguishes between:

divine law -- "that law which God has set to the actions of men, -- whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny." (quoted in Jones, 262)

civil law

law of opinion or reputation -- which Jones characterizes as "an empirical generalization summarizing the experience of some particular society concerning the best means to happiness -- for example, 'Honesty is the best policy.'" (262)

This means, in turn, that "the function of political theory was to discover what kind of state organization is most likely to bring civil law into conformity with divine law." (263)

Possible sources of discovering the commands of divine law

(a) Medieval/Catholic -- traditions of the Church

(b) Luther -- Scripture

(c) Locke -- reason: the principles of morality are capable of demonstration by reason (recalling, e.g, Plato/Aristotle, Spinoza)
 

As Jones points out, there is a significant problem here: to have ethics serve as a demonstrable science in this fashion -- in contrast with physics which requires sense experience of particulars to demonstrate the truth of its general claims --, one must believe (as did Spinoza and Plato) that ideas and universals are real. That is, they must be more than generalizations drawn from particulars -- for this leads to only probabilistic knowledge. But Locke, of course, is an empiricist for whom ideas and universals can only be such sense-based generalizations.

In any case, there is in Locke a nice synthesis of medieval and modern views: given, as Jones points out, that one is (a) convinced of the truths of Christianity and (b) a utilitarian -- then Locke's system neatly holds together these two views by presenting God as reinforcing the basic order of the universe [in which one, qua utilitarian, is "built" to seek out one's great good/pleasure] with a system of ultimate pleasures and pains. So, while enlightened utilitarians will follow moral law because of the long-range earthly pleasure which will result -- the unenlightened will follow the law (and achieve the same results) because of fear of hell and hope for heaven.

Politics

Begins with a considerably different conception of the state of nature than we find in Hobbes. Given (a) his acceptance of Christianity and (b) his moral rationalism [i.e., the belief that a fundamental moral order exists in the world and reason is capable of discerning it] -- we should not be surprised to discover that the "state of nature" is fairly pleasant. [see pp. 267f., including:

The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions....]

If certain rights are "built-in" to us qua natural creatures -- and if we, qua rational creatures have the capacity to recognize and behave according to our understanding of these rights -- then a moral and social order can exist prior to the establishment of a given political state. This further means:

(a) we now have a conceptual means for justifying the existence of the state -- i.e., the state is justified as it works to better protect our basic natural rights;

(b) we now have a conceptual means for criticizing and evaluating a particular state to determine whether or not it fulfills its primary function -- namely, to protect basic natural rights.

political equality: "...that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man," quoted in Jones, 269; not equality in the sense of having no political subordination and no use of force.

However reasonable this might seem on first glance, there is the problem of consent: what reason have we to suppose that "the majority will be more wise, prudent, and restrained in using force than a single individual." (270) That is, what distinguishes this from surrendering to an absolute monarch?

(Part of Locke's reply, which Jones neglects to mention, rests on his rationalism: given the use of reason by the majority, we can be optimistic regarding the correctness of majority rule. But this by no means solves the problem entirely.)

Other topics of note:

Labor theory of property, along with efforts to limit the accumulation of wealth (in light of rights to life, pursuit of property) through the "no spoilage" clause,

-- countered by the invention of money as a way of avoiding the proscription against spoilage.

[Note as well the agricultural economy and virtually unlimited "nature" assumed by Locke in order to justify unlimited accumulation of wealth.]

--> thus Jones' accusation that "Locke was more interested in finding a plausible defense of the status quo than in getting to the root of the matter." (273)

Separation between church/state -- reflecting doctrine of the two-fold truth --> "legitimation crisis" of modernity, as the domain of values are divorced from the domain of praxis.

II. Seeds of destruction

A. Empiricist epistemology: ironically, the empiricist attack on Descartes and [Continental] idealism will also undermine the basic conceptions of [modern] natural science:

1. Experience supports only the idea of alteration, not of cause:
 

...when we see one billiard ball strike another, we experience only the transfer, not the production of motion. Where, then, do we get the idea of agency, or active power? From introspection, Locke believed. "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest." (Jones 250)

2. Existence, continued existence cannot be demonstrated. We may assume existence with relative certainty -- but this is only probable knowledge. While "sufficient for our condition," this (again) confirms Descartes' argumentation [the demand for certainty can not be satisfied by sense-experience].