Marks of Modernity - some suggestions:
1. Dualist logic
2. (dualism) --> notion of history as "Progress"
3) Power as a legitimate pursuit (Machiavelli) --> no limits ("hubris" - I will be God or die!)
4. --> Legitimation crisis:
Highlights - Hobbes
One of the central issues brought to the fore for us by Hobbes
is what happens when we shift
As Jones notes repeatedly: the success of the (re)new(ed) natural sciences focuses our attention on the material, and on "science" as accounting for (material) "facts". But this raises the question - one raised in several specific ways by Hobbes - "what is the place of (moral/religious) value in a world of (scientifically discovered) facts?"
The short answer for Hobbes: there is no place for "values" in a purely materialistic world.
But: as we examine Hobbes' theories - we want to pay close attention to how far he can succeed in banishing value entirely.
The short answer is: he can't - his theories remain contradictory and inconsistent as a result.
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Accepts the Medieval (and Ancient) assumption of philosophy as the effort to develop a complete, systematic overview of all things (cf. Jones 120) -
but, what makes him "modern" is his effort to do with a view towards
certainty as a primary value, which turns him towards
mathematics as "the" paradigmatic science.
That is - unlike Aristotle, who holds both mathematics and ethics together in a pluralism -
Hobbes will assert the primacy of one form of knowledge: all others must be subsumed under it (--> reductionism as a characteristic "maneauver" of modern philosophy: "religion" reduced to drives, etc.)
This exclusion shows up in the passage quoted on 121 - reflecting,
in particular, the Medieval doctrine of "two-fold truth,"
and, more broadly, the dualistic logic Hobbes seems to
assume. That is, one has
This dualism shows up again, p. 123:
But, since man (MAN) is a finite knower - "...it is impossible either for a many or any other creature to have any conception of infinite."
This illustrates why the doctrine of the two-fold truth was rejected in the Middle Ages: it logically concludes with the claim that human beings cannot know God in any way - which arguably shuts down the possibility of any religious belief system which involves knowledge claims about God!
Given Hobbes' shift to simply "matter and its motion," he assumes a universal causality determining this matter, issuing in an optimism about what human beings (eventually) will acquire - namely, knowledge of all things, resulting as they must, from necessary causes (see p. 125; cf. La Place).
--> Rejection of the notion that names have any special/essential meaning as grounded in their refering to "things" "out there." (Postmodernists note!) Rather, names are merely arbitrary signs. This conclusion, while allowing him to skirt the classical puzzles about identity underlying things that change - and yet we call by the same name - it also leads him directly to an extreme nominalism (see esp. p. 133)
And from here, as we will see - to an extreme relativism.
That is: everything is simply a matter of arbitrary definitions (since nothing about the external collection of matter in motion forces us to use any given term in a specific way).
On the face of it, this may sound plausible - but it leads to a major paradox/conflict: if any claim to "knowledge" is simply the result of using arbitrary language like counters in a game -
then why is Hobbes' theory - including his theory about language as an arbitrary set of names, and his theory of reason as simply playing games with language as with "counters" - any more "true" than alternative theories?
The best answer Hobbes can give is that at least his theory will give human beings greater power over their environment. (see Jones, 134)
BUT: if I'm a real relativist - why is power to be prefered over the lack of power?
--> Hobbes' account of human nature
Relatedly: Hobbes will argue that "truth" depends entirely on what the sovereign decrees, insofar as the sovereign is to enforce a given set of definitions as the "truth" within his kingdom. (see Jones, 135)
But what if the sovereign chose not to enforce Hobbes' theory? Would that make his theory about sovereigns enforcing "truth" untrue? Etc.
More immediately, Hobbes is characteristically "modern" by his effort to account for an epistemology as a primary starting point in his philosophy: this leads us to the doctrine of "cogitating motions" and "phantasms," the knowers of motions.
--> immediate paradox: how can a bundle of moving atoms (the knowing self) "know"/be conscious of any other bundle of moving atoms?
(So Jones: "Why a motion should be exerienced as a sensation at all, and why one motion is experienced as middle C and another as red, are, and remain, complete mysteries as far as first philosophy goes." (128)
Given that Hobbes intended to explain just this - his system stumbles from the outset.
--> related paradox: if all we have is sense-knowledge - how can we recognize the generic, universal deceptiveness of experience/sense-knowledge? (129f)
(Hobbes's doctrine of the association of ideas as resulting from taking too seriously his own mechanistic paradigm.)
Further problems: Hobbes' materialistic universe is not only marked by nominalism - but also by antirationalism.
Where is reason - including: consciousness, intentionality (the ability to decide what one will be conscious of - see Jones, 138), and free choice - in a universe of matter and its motion?
If he is to be consistent - such a universe can hold no place for reason: - and yet, Hobbes engages in arguments, addressed to rational audiences, intended to logically persuade them of the truth of his (antirational!) view...
And:
Why should to-ward and from-ward motion be "felt" at all?
Why should these be felt as pleasure and as pain (respectively)?
(cf. Jones, 139)
Human nature: notice the definition offered on 140 - human beings as what Nietzsche will call "will to power".
Is this description correct?
How does it compare with
a) ancient Greek views (e.g., Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, etc.)
b) various Jewish and Christian views - including the Augustinian view of Original Sin?
In any case,
human nature (as self-interested, desire driven) --> ethics --> politics
(see Jones, 141f.)
Account of religion: notice its reductive / Stoic elements (142-144)
Another paradox: Hobbes' political theory amounts to an effort to rationally justify / "legitimate" the sovereign as a total/totalitarian power - i.e., as it is required by our human nature + desire for orderly state.
While the sovereign can use religion to justify his position and power to the masses - as far as the sovereign is concerned, the only "real" issue is power: but, "it needs no justification, for there are no moral justifications for anything." (Jones 148)
So why does Hobbes need to justify the sovereign?
--> Hobbes justifies the sovereign by making men out to be entirely irrational, vicious, etc. - so that
they must see - rationally - that they will be better off under the control of an absolute power.
How can we be entirely irrational in the first stage - and then acquire enough "reason" to agree to the need for the sovereign in the second stage?
--> "legitimation crises" of modernity (Habermas)