Descartes
(1596-1650)
Dr. Ess
[Taken from: W. T. Jones,
Hobbes to Hume: A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. III,
2nd ed. (1969) Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. (pp. 154-189), with additional
comments from Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge.]
- Descartes had a sense
of novelty of the age in which he lived, and a contempt for all past learning,
and a supreme confidence in the capacity of the human intellect to solve
all human problems.
Overview:
Method: rules from Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind, including Oldroyd's comment (and Ess' counter) on the central importance of Descartes' version of rationalism for democratic polity.
Summary of Descartes' arguments (from the Discourse on Method and the Meditations on First Philosophy) which provide the underpinnings of moderns' belief in mathematics as a reliable method of knowledge:
The Self, Doubt and the Quest for Certainty
Cogito Ergo Sum: the existence of self as the one certain claim
[The way out of self:] proof of God's existence
Criticisms
of the proof of God's existence
Contrast
between Plato and Descartes regarding mathematics and knowledge
Additional Philosophical Views:
Descartes' Conception of Substance
The Cartesian Compromise (between free will requirements and material determinism)
Interaction between the
two substances - mind (as unextended, thinking "stuff") and
body (as extended, unthinking "stuff").
THE METHOD - Some important rules from Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind:
RULE III. In the subjects we propose to investigate, our inquiries should be directed, not to what others have thought, nor to what we ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly and perspicuously behold and with certainty deduce; for knowledge is not won in any other way....
- Two ways to "arrive at the knowledge of things":
(a) intuition - ...not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind give us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt that which we understand...intuition...springs from the light of reason alone....
(b) deduction - ...we understand all necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty. [For] many things are known with certainty, though not by themselves evident, but only deduced from true and known principles by the continuous and uninterrupted action of a mind that has a clear vision of each step in the process. It is in a similar way that we know that the last link in a long chain in connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only remember that we have taken them successively under review and that each single one is united to its neighbour, from the first even to the last....
RULE IV. There is need of a method for finding out the truth.
RULE V. Method
consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which
our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth. We shall
comply with it exactly if we reduce involved and obscure propositions step
by step to those that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive
apprehension of all those that are absolutely simple, attempt to ascend
to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar steps. [in Oldroyd,
69]
[Oldroyd importantly points
out, "Yet despite the seeming traditional character of the procedure,
Descartes did have something new in mind. He supposed (in Rule 12) that
the mind could form mental images of geometrical forms by the direct impression
of ideas in the brain; and the vis cognoscens (cognitive
awareness) could be aware of these `ideas' - either directly in direct
sensation or subsequently in acts of memory. This epistemological thesis
was supposed to provide the underpinning of the methodological directives
of the Regulae For the mind could supposedly manipulate geometrical
lines and figures in the brain (or the imagination), thereby solving certain
algebraic problems geometrically. However, towards the end of the Regulae
it would seem that Descartes came to realize that his project was untenable.
One could not do general algebgra (for example, the solution of quadratic
and higher-order equations) by the simple mental manipulation of lines
and rectangles. So the program came unstuck, and the Regulae were
left incomplete, only being published posthumously. (Oldroyd, 69)]
RULE VI. In
order to separate out what is quite simple from what is complex, and to
arrange these matters methodically, we ought, in the case of every series
in which we have deduced certain facts the one from the other, to notice
which fact is simple.... (1) We must note first that for the purpose of
our procedure, which does not regard things as isolated realities, but
compares them with one another in order to discover the dependence in knowledge
of one upon the other, all things can be said to be either absolute or
relative. (2) Secondly, we must note that there are but few pure and simple
essences....These we say should be carefully noticed, for they are just
those facts which we have called the simplest in any single series. All
others can only be perceived as deductions from these, either immediate
and proximate, or not to be attained save by two or three or more acts
of inference....So pronounced is everywhere the inter-connection of ground
and consequence, which gives rise, in the objects to be examined, to those
series to which every inquiry must be reduced, that it can be investigated
by a sure method....
RULE VIII.
If the matters to be examined we come to a step in the series of which
our understanding is not sufficently well able to have an intuitive cognition,
we must stop short here. We must make no attempt to examine what follows;
thus we shall spare ourselves superfluous labor.
COMMENT
ON DESCARTES' METHOD - The assumption that there is in all men a native
power adequate to know a reality that is fundementally rational combined
the best insights in the Greek and Christian traditions. The Greeks assumed
that reason is an adequate power, but they held that is not equal in all
men. The early Christians took little or no account of reason, but they
assumed all men are morally equal before God. By making reason adequate
and equal in all men, Descartes laid the intellectual basis for the social
and political institutions of democracy.
[Warning! On some
readings of Descartes, this apparent "egalitarianism" is alleged
to be part of a rhetorical "cover" for a radical project - namely,
the establishment of a uniquely modern metaphysics which includes
simply human beings and the natural order (i.e., not God).]
DESCARTES'
MATHEMATICAL MODEL - Descartes believed that there is an objective,
rational order in the world, an order that the mind infallibly discerns
in its clear and distinct intuitions. - For Descartes, mathematical knowledge
was absolute; it was an insight into an objective and rational real. Mathematical
reasoning was the basis on which a great metaphysical structure, including
a system of values and a God, could be erected.
THE
SELF and DOUBT - Descartes held that in geometry one starts
from self-evident and independent truths and arranges the various theorems
that depend on these truths in proper order. So, in philosophy, Descartes
held that one must look first for some metaphysical "absolute"
and then for the various theorems that, when arranged in proper order,
will yield an absolutely certain science of reality. Science was an insight
into the nature of an objective and rational reality. - One was to proceed
in the search for a metaphysical absolute by challenging every belief,
however widely accepted and plausible it might be, in order to see whether
it in fact met the test of certainty. - Descartes' doubt was methodological:
He undertook simply to suspend his beliefs until he could prove them conclusively.
Given an absolute starting point, he would begin a reconstruction in the
course of which his former beliefs would be reinstated as they were deduced
in accordance with the new and infallible method that he had derived from
his study of geometry.
COGITO
ERGO SUM - Descartes found one thing that he certainly and infallibly
knew - that he doubted. If you try to doubt your own existence, this doubt
disproves itself. One must surely exist in order to doubt that one exists.
- Here in his certainty of his own existence, Descartes had the "absolute,"
the indubitable truth, that he needed as a starting point for his science
of reality. Accordingly, he proposed to follow his own rules - to arrange
his thoughts in "due order" and to advance by a series of simple
steps, each of which could be seen to be clearly and distinctly true. The
road proved to lead from self to God, and from God to the physical world.
(1) Everything, including our ideas, has a cause.
(2) We have an idea of God.
(3) Nothing less than God is adequate to be the cause of our idea of God.
Therefore, (4) God exists.
[Oldroyd's conception of the argument:
A1 (1) Descartes knew that he did not know everything with certainty. Therefore
(2) He acknowledged himself to be imperfect (and he had the concept of imperfection in his mind).
A2 (1) For Descartes to have the idea of imperfection, he also had to have the idea of perfection.
(2) The idea of perfection could not have been in his mind unless there were a perfect being.
Therefore, (3) Therefore
a perfect being exists - God. (Oldroyd, 70)]
CRITICISM OF THIS PROOF - There are two stages in the Cartesian proof, and each of them may be challenged:
[1] Do we really have a clear and distinct idea of an infinite and perfect being?
[2] Supposing that we do
have such an idea, is God its only possible cause?
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN DESCARTES' AND PLATO'S VIEWS OF KNOWLEDGE - Though he held
reason to be independent, Descartes did not think of it as the completely
secular and self-sustaining power that Plato and Aristotle had conceived
it to be. Descartes was not willing to let reason remain utterly secular.
According to him, the "more" that validates our finite reason
is not merely more reason. There is more reason, it is true; but behind
the more reason there lurks a personal and transcendent God. - Intuition,
usually conceived by Descartes as an active power in us, sometimes became
a passive state in which we are illumined from above; and reason, far from
being a searchlight that focuses a clear beam on real entities out there
in the world beyond us, became a superillumination that fills our souls
with transcendent light and truth.
THE
PHYSICAL WORLD - The proof of the existence of the physical world rests
on God's goodness and His power - on His will, not His reason. The fact
that this proof depends on God's will, instead of on His reason, is a sign
that Descartes recognized that there is a distinction between "corporeal
nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics" and corporeal
nature as extended magnitude. - If his proof of the existence of matter
is valid, the physical world is God's creature, an expression of His providence;
yet it runs according to mechanical law and can be completely understood
without any further reference to purposes or final causes.
DESCARTES'
CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE - That substances exist seemed so obvious to
Descartes that he held we must "conclude" that a substance is
"neccessarily present" wherever we encounter a property, even
though the substance in question is "not observed by us." Hence
it never occurred to him to subject the concept of substance to criticism
in accordance with his program of systematic doubt, even though he was
prepared to doubt the existence of things that are "observed by us."
THE
CARTESIAN COMPROMISE - If mind and body are completely different kinds
of things, and if the truths about each follow from the distinct nature
of each, it is impossible for the science of minds and the science of bodies
to contradict each other. Theologians, therefore, have no reason to interfere
with the study of physics, and physicists have no reason to claim any special
competence regarding spiritual truths. Further, men need never fear, for
instance, that minds, as well as bodies, are determined by antecedent events
in time; nor is there any danger that free will, moral responsibility,
and God will prove to be merely subjective illusions in a materialistic
universe. There can be no conflict between science and religion, for each
is sovereign in its own sphere and neither has any standing in the sphere
of the other.
NATURE
OF MATERIAL THINGS - The physical world, Descartes held, is a material
plenum; all change is local motion of various parts of this plenum; since
this motion conforms to simple, mathematically statable laws, it is capable
of being predicted with complete certainty. - The net result of Descartes'
identification of material substance with extension and of extension with
space was to make physics an absolutely certain science. For by means of
this double identification, geometry, which is the absolutely valid science
of the properties of space, becomes the instrument by which the nature
of material things is to be investigated.
NATURE
OF MIND - Everything in the created universe that is not a body is
a mind, or self. Since each of us is a self, we know the nature of mind
much better than we know the nature of body, and we "observe many
more qualities in our mind than in any other thing."
VOLITION
- Religious and moral considerations made it seem essential to Descartes
to establish the freedom of the will.
UNDERSTANDING - Distinction between:
(1) thinking - which is cognition of the world as it is, namely, a universe of unextended minds and of material substances possessing only "length, breadth, and depth."
(2) sensing - which
is perception of a world of colored, sounding, and odorous bodies. - If
a mind and its objects are different substances, how does a mind come to
know its objects? It cannot go out in the world to study it in situ, nor
can the world, concieved of as matter in motion, come into the mind. A
cognitive link between mind and world was thus needed. This link, which
Descartes called an "idea," is a state of the mind, and a true
idea represents in the mind the object out there that is its cause.
DOCTRINE OF INNATE IDEAS - As long as ideas are regarded as the mental links between minds and their world, it is necessary to distinguish between:
[1] The cause of the truth of an idea
[2] The cause of anyone's having the idea at all
[3] The cause of someone's having the idea now -
Descartes' whole position
depends on the assertion that our ideas of simple natures are adequate;
and he could make sure of their adequacy only by claiming that our ideas
of simple natures have been implanted in us by God, that is, that they
are innate.
PERCEPTION
- The main trouble with perception is simply that men tend to take it at
face value. They ignore the distinction just pointed out, and, "perverting
the order of nature," they assume that the senses yield information
about "the essence of the bodies which are outside" them. If,
however, men learn not to expect more of perception than it can give, they
will find that, for the purposes of ordinary life, it is not a bad guide.
INTERACTION
- If mind and body are the two distinct substances that the Cartesian compromise
required them to be, how can they interact in sense perception and emotion?
According to Descartes, interaction occurs in the pineal gland, which is
located between the two hemispheres of the brain. - The major problem that
Descartes faced was how to save the Cartesian compromise. Unfortunately
the mind and the body meet at least at one point - in man. A man's mind
acts on his body and his body acts on his mind. But the assertion that
a completely free mind produces changes in its body is ultimately fatal
for the Cartesian compromise.
[Oldroyd sees Descartes' metascience as structured like the `arch' with his emphasis chiefly on the `downward', deductive limb - i.e., deductions drawn from the first principles of a science, following the model of drawing conclusions from the first axioms of a mathematical system.
But in contrast with other
philosophers who stress the inductive character of building up
to these first principles on the basis of observation, etc. - Descartes
also makes the upward ascent deductive, with his proof of
the existence of God. His actual scientific and mathematical investigations
do not hold any particular `archetectural form'. (Oldroyd, 72-73)]